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Abstract
The U.S. retail sector has changed over the past three decades from one with many small
firms to one dominated by large firms. The first chapter uses new data to document these
changes at both the national and local level. It shows that concentration has been increasing
in the U.S. retail sector at both the local and national level for the past 30 years. It shows
that the primary contributor to the rise in national retailers is the growth of national retail
firms that have stores in many markets and the exit of small retail firms. The second chapter
of this work relates those changes to trade by establishing that stores of small retail firms are
more likely to close when their competitors import directly. This work combines detailed
measures of store sales with data on imports of each store’s competitors to establish that
stores of small firms are more likely to close when their competitors import directly. The
final chapter of this work estimates a model of retailer entry decisions with direct imports
to estimate the net effect of imports on local retail markets. I estimate that shutting down
trade would not decrease local concentration because although small retail firms would enter
markets, the largest retailers would exit.
Simultaneously, foreign sourcing of consumer goods has increased substantially, with much
of that increase driven by large retailers’ imports from China. This study examines the role
of direct imports from China in the transformation of the U.S. retail sector. I propose two
changes to measuring concentration. Existing work on concentration tends to study its evo-
lution using national, industry-level data, but these metrics provide an incomplete picture
given the local nature of competition in retail and the growing importance of multi-product
general merchandisers who compete across industries. I therefore construct new data on
store-level revenue for all U.S. retailers by 20 major categories of goods. While the national
product-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index more than doubled between 1997 and 2007, lo-
cal concentration increased by only 50 percent. The new local-by-product concentration
measures also enable me to perform an analysis of the role of globalization in increased
concentration. I construct a measure of each small store’s exposure to direct imports of
large retailers. Using a store-level Bartik instrument (1991), the results suggest that a one
percentage point increase in exposure to direct imports leads to a 0.7-1.7 percentage point
increase in the probability a small store exits. I use a dynamic, continuous-time entry model
to estimate the net effect of imports on the structure of competition in clothing sales, a
product category highly exposed to direct imports. The results indicate that direct imports
account for at least 14 percent of the decrease in the number of small clothing stores.
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Chapter 1
The Evolution of U.S. Retail
Concentration
1.1 Introduction
In the past 30 years, U.S. retailing has become substantially more concentrated. Between
1997 and 2007, the share of sales going to the 20 largest firms increased from 18.5 percent
to 25.4 (Hortac¸su and Syverson, 2015). During this time period, the national Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) in retail doubled (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and Van Reenen,
2017). These patterns appear to be part of an economy-wide trend toward greater ownership
concentration (Autor et al., 2017) and an increase in the dominance of large, established
firms (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2014). There is evidence that increases in
concentration are accompanied by steeply rising variable markups (De Loecker and Eeck-
hout, 2017; Hall, 2018), which raises concerns about rising market power and prices.
Yet, most of the currently available evidence on concentration of the retail sector relies
on national industry-based measures. These measures suffer from two major drawbacks.
First, they describe national trends, although most retail markets are local, with consumers
choosing between establishments in their geographical vicinity that sell a given product,
making local concentration the relevant measure of the competitive environment in retail.
The growth in national concentration can, but need not imply, concentration in local mar-
kets. To see this clearly, suppose that initially each U.S. city has a different largest store.
Then suppose that a national retailer opens a store in each market, replacing the largest
store but without displacing any business from the smaller stores. Then national concen-
tration would rise, while local concentration would not. Alternatively, growth in national
retailers might displace not just the largest stores but also smaller local ones, in which case
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growth in national concentration would be accompanied by a growth in local concentration.
Whether the national expansion of large retailers, such as Walmart and Target, increases
local retail concentration depends on whether they displace large, medium-sized, or small
local retailers.
The second drawback is the reliance on industry-based measures, which do not account for
the increasing importance of general merchandise establishments. Establishments in general
merchandising compete with stores in many other industries. For example, Walmart is in the
general merchandising subsector (3-digit NAICS 452) but competes with grocery, clothing,
and toy stores.1 Competition across industries can be important, as in the case of sales of
grocery stores, where between 1992 and 2002 the share of grocery sales accounted for by
general merchandisers increased from 6.9 to 18.2 (Basker and Noel, 2009).
This paper addresses both concerns by first providing a novel decomposition of the national
HHI into a component driven by local market concentration and a new component that
we call “cross-market” concentration which is driven by consumers in different markets
shopping at the same firms. This decomposition is useful for separating the contribution to
national concentration of changes in local markets from the expansion of large national retail
chains (such as Walmart and Target) that took place during the last three decades. We show
that the increase in national concentration is almost completely due to increases in the cross-
market term. The second step in addressing the concerns raised above consists of measuring
retail concentration using new data on store-level revenue for all U.S. retailers in 20 major
categories of goods between 1982 and 2012. We combine two sources of confidential U.S.
Census Bureau microdata that cover 1982 to 2012, namely the Census of Retail Trade and
the Longitudinal Business Data. These new data allow us to measure concentration at the
local level for each product category, taking into account the role of general merchandisers
in each market. The coverage of the data makes it possible to document the evolution of
U.S. retail concentration.
Using these data we document several new facts on concentration in the retail sector. First,
we show that both the national and local HHI increase, but at different rates, with the
national HHI increasing faster than the local HHI, particularly after 1997. The decompo-
sition of national HHI into local and cross-market concentration, shows that the increases
in national and local concentration are due to different factors. Changes in national con-
centration are driven by consumers in different markets shopping at the same stores (cross-
market concentration), not changes in local concentration. The decomposition shows that
1References to specific firms are based on public data and do not imply the company is present in the
confidential micro data.
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98 percent of the change in national concentration is explained by changes in cross-market
concentration. Second, we show that the increases in local concentration are broad-based.
Most markets and product categories feature increasing concentration. The HHI increased
in 81 percent of commuting zones accounting for 72 percent of retail sales in 2007. The HHI
also increased in 7 of the major 8 product categories in retail. Finally, we document dif-
ferences between industry-based and product-based measures of concentration. First, these
measures are conceptually different, as they have different definitions of a market. These
differences are increasingly important due to the rise of general merchandisers. Second,
we show that product-based measures of concentration (that incorporate competition from
general merchandisers) are lower than industry-based measures. The average product-HHI
at the national and local level is about a third of the average industry-HHI. However, all
measures of concentration share an upward trend.
Our main contribution is to the growing literature on concentration. As is well understood
by researchers, there is an important distinction between national and local concentration in
retail, thus, we contribute by providing new measurements of concentration for local markets
and relating them to the increase in national concentration and the growing importance of
multi-market firms. The closest paper to ours is Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2019),
which evaluates changes in concentration at both the national and local levels in multiple
sectors (e.g. manufacturing, retail, etc.). Using the U.S. National Establishment Time Series
(NETS) establishment-level data set, they find that between 1992 and 2012, concentration
at the national level increased in six major sectors, while local concentration decreased.2
The findings in this study at the national level are similar to those in Rossi-Hansberg et al.
(2019). However, our results at the local level differ sharply, as we find concentration at the
local level has generally been increasing across the various product categories in the retail
industry.3 There are multiple reasons for our results to differ, but the major difference is
the data source. Data in the present study are based on confidential information collected
by the Census Bureau and Internal Revenue Service. They are considered the gold standard
for measuring economic activity at the store level. These records make it clear that local
concentration has been increasing, though not as much as at the national level. More details
on these differences are provided in Appendix A.1.
2For the retail sector national concentration increased by five percentage points, while local level con-
centration decreased by 14 percentage points. Numbers are taken from the retail sector line in Figure 1b in
Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2019).
3These results are in line with other studies that have documented that local trends in retail may differ
from local trends in other sectors. In particular, Rinz (2018) and Lipsius (2018) look at concentration in
labor markets using census micro-data, finding increasing labor market concentration in retail, but decreasing
labor market concentration overall.
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This study contribute to the literature on concentration by measuring national and local
concentration using product-level revenue, which handles the multi-product nature of large
retailers. There has been substantial work documenting increasing national retail concen-
tration at the industry level (Foster, Haltiwanger, Klimek, Krizan and Ohlmacher (2015);
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2015); Autor et al. (2017)), but much less work measuring con-
centration at the local level (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2019). Results show that national and
local concentration are increasing at both the product and industry level.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the growing body of work on increased national
concentration, and its relation to the declining labor share (Autor et al., 2017), and the de-
clining churn and reallocation of aggregate activity to large established firms (Decker et al.,
2014). These trends may reflect increased allocative efficiency but also raise concerns about
market power and rising prices (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). Despite a broad consensus
on increased concentration, there is little evidence on the mechanisms driving the change.
This paper provides a new result linking changes in local concentration and expansion of
firms across locations to national concentration. We apply this result to new micro-data
focusing on a specific sector, retail, in which the growth in aggregate concentration has been
particularly dramatic. The results make it clear that increases in national concentration
need not imply increasing local concentration, making it important to distinguish between
local and aggregate trends when assessing the effects of concentration in the economy.
Finally, the decomposition of the HHI presented in this paper contributes to the litera-
ture on the measurement of concentration by developing a new interpretation of the HHI.
Multiple decompositions of the HHI have been developed, including a decomposition into a
component due to the number of stores in a market and a component due to how unequal
the market shares of the stores are. We interpret the HHI as a probability, namely the
probability that two dollars spent at random in a market are spent in the same firm. This
interpretation allows for multiple decompositions based on the Law of Total Probability.
We focus on decomposing the national HHI into an average of local HHIs and a cross market
term that captures consumers in different markets buying goods at the same firm. However,
this approach can also be used to bound the potential error in the HHI based on market
mispecification among other applications.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 establishes the relation between
local and national concentration and develops a decomposition of national concentration
into local and cross-market concentration. Section 3.2 describes the data, including how to
construct store-level sales by product. Section 1.4 measures national and local concentration
and establishes the main facts about their evolution since 1982. Section 1.5 describes how
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the results vary across locations and products. Section 1.6 shows that defining retail markets
using industry data can be problematic. The final section concludes.
1.2 National and Local Concentration
The increasing trend of national concentration in various sectors of the economy has been
widely documented, and has attracted the attention of the literature, in part due to the
potential impacts of concentration on competitive behavior, firm growth, declining labor
share, innovation, and other aspects of firm behavior (i.a., Autor et al., 2017; Decker et al.,
2017; Akcigit and Ates, 2019). One major outstanding question in this literature concerns
the mechanisms behind the increase in national concentration. In particular, what is the role
of local concentration in the rise of national concentration? Consumers buy many goods and
services in their local area, making local markets relevant for competition (Rossi-Hansberg
et al., 2019).
Increasing national concentration can be accompanied by increasing local concentration,
but it may also be accompanied by decreases in local concentration. In fact, not much
can be learned from the dynamics of local concentration having information only about
national trends. The simple example shown in Figure 1.1 makes this clear. National con-
centration can increase by having firms expand across markets, without affecting the layout
of individual markets (row 2). Alternatively, the expansion of large firms can drive out com-
petitors in local markets, increasing national and local concentration (row 1), or can bring
up more—and likely smaller—competitors, in turn decreasing local concentration (row 3).
The total effect on national and local concentration depends on how firms in individual
markets respond.
The example in Figure 1.1 highlights the two mechanisms affecting national concentration
that we study in this paper. National concentration is affected by changes in local con-
centration and in cross-market concentration. The first mechanism draws the link between
changes in the layout of local markets and concentration at the national level. As local
markets become more/less concentrated so does the aggregate economy (in a given sector).
The second mechanism links national concentration to cross-market concentration, that is,
the presence of the same firms across various markets. As firms expand across markets they
capture a larger share of national sales, in turn increasing national concentration. Note that,
as shown in Figure 1.1, changes in cross-market concentration need not be accompanied by
changes in local concentration. In what follows we make these ideas precise by developing
a new decomposition of national concentration into local and cross-market concentration.
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Figure 1.1: Effect of Increasing National Concentration on Local Concentration
Unchanged
Decreasing
In
cr
ea
sin
g
Market 1 Market 2
Firm C
Firm D
Firm A
Firm B
Market 1
Market 2
Walmart Walmart
Walmart Walmart
Firm B Firm D
Walmart Walmart
Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D
Notes: Figure shows hypothetical market structures after the entry of Walmart into markets.
We measure concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is one
of the most common measures of concentration and its formulation will prove useful in
decomposing the mechanisms behind the changes in national concentration. We measure
concentration at the product category level throughout the paper,4 using each firm’s, i,
share of sales in product j at time t, sjti .
5 The national HHI in a year is defined as the sum
of the product-level HHIs in each year, weighted by the share of product j’s sales in total
retail sales, stj :
HHIt =
J∑
j=1
stj
N∑
i=1
(
sjti
)2
, (1.1)
4Distinguishing markets by product categories is critical to determine which establishments (or firms at
the national level) are in direct competition with one-another. This is particularly relevant in the retail
sector as discussed in Section 3.2. Details of the definition of product categories are presented in Section 3.2
and in Appendix B.1.2.
5Superscripts and subscripts are defined such that sba is the share OF a IN b.
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while the local HHI of market m and product j in year t is is calculated as:
HHItmj =
N∑
i=1
(
sjmti
)2
. (1.2)
The formulation of the HHI is useful in understanding the connection between local and
national concentration. From (1.1) it is clear that the national HHI for a product j measures
the probability that two dollars, x and y, chosen at random, are spent at the same firm.6
This interpretation of the HHI as a probability is what allows us to capture the separate
role of local and cross-market concentration. Intuitively, the probability that two dollars are
spent in the same firm goes up if the firm has captured more of the sales in the market(s)
it is present (increase in local concentration), or if the firm is present in more markets
(cross-market concentration).
The interpretation of the HHI goes beyond providing intuition for the mechanisms affecting
national concentration. Since the index is a probability, it can be decomposed using the
law of total probability into two terms: a weighted average of local concentration and a
residual term, which we refer to as cross-market concentration. As mentioned above, Local
concentration measures the extent to which consumers in a local market shop at the same
firm, while cross-market concentration measures the degree to which consumers in different
locations shop at the same firm. The decomposition is given by:
P (ix = iy)︸ ︷︷ ︸
National HHI
=
Collocation︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (mx = my)P (ix = iy|mx = my)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local HHI
+
1 - Collocation︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (mx 6= my)P (ix = iy|mx 6= my)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cross Market HHI
, (1.3)
where ix is the firm at which dollar x is spent and mx is the market in which dollar x is
spent, likewise for y.7
Equation (1.3) has three components. The first component, P (mx = my), which we term
collocation, is the probability that two dollars are spent in the same market. The collocation
term is given by:
P (mx = my) =
M∑
m=1
(sm)
2 , (1.4)
where sm is the share of market m in national sales. The second component, P (ix = iy|mx =
6In what follows, the j and t superscripts are dropped on all variables for convenience.
7It is worthwhile noting that this is not the only decomposition that can be obtained using this method.
The particular decomposition in (1.3) is motivated by the question on the connection between national and
local trends in concentration. Appendix A.2 presents further details on the decomposition.
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my), is an aggregate index of local concentration, with local concentration measured as in
equation (1.2).8 The third component, P (ix = iy|mx 6= my), which we call cross-market
concentration, captures the probability that a dollar spent in different markets is spent at
the same firm:
P (ix = iy|mx 6= my) =
∑
m
∑
n6=m
smsn
1−∑p s2p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weights
N∑
i=1
smi s
n
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cross Market
(1.5)
The cross-market concentration index between two markets (say m and n) is given by the
product of the shares of the firms in each market (the probability that two dollars spent
one in each market are spent in the same firm). The pairs of markets are then weighted by
their share of sales and summed.
Of the three terms, the collocation term plays a crucial role in determining the extent of the
impact of local concentration in national measures. A low collocation term implies that local
concentration can only have a limited effect on national trends, leaving the cross-market
term as the driver of the national index. We will show later that this is in fact the case.9
To implement the decomposition presented in equation (1.3) we need to measure concen-
tration in each local market for a given product, as well as to link the activities of firms
across markets. Doing this requires detailed data on establishment-level revenue by product
for all firms in the U.S.. In the next Section we use confidential microdata from the U.S.
Census Bureau to construct a new data set that allows us to measure local concentration
and implement the decomposition. We find that local concentration increases in the U.S.,
albeit at a slower rate than national concentration. Nevertheless, the decomposition shows
that national concentration is almost entirely determined by cross-market concentration,
with the increase in local concentration having a very limited impact on the increase of
national concentration. As explained above, this is due to the low value of the collocation
term in the data. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 expand on these results.
8In the decomposition each local market is weighted by the conditional probability that the two dollars
are spent in market m, given that they are spent in the same market: s
2
m/(1−
∑
p s
2
p). This tends to weight
larger markets more than the more usual weight sm—the share of sales (of product j) accounted by market
m (at time t). To facilitate comparison of the results with other work, we present aggregated series for local
concentration in Section 1.4 that use the latter weights.
9The low value of the collocation term should come as no surprise, because the U.S. has many markets
and even the largest markets represent only a small fraction of total U.S. sales.
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1.3 Data: Retailer Revenue for All U.S. Stores
This section describes the creation of new data on store-level revenue for 20 product cate-
gories for all stores with at least one employee in the U.S. retail sector. These data allow for
the construction of detailed measures of concentration that take into account competition
between stores selling similar products in specific geographical areas.10
1.3.1 Data Description
This paper combines two sources of confidential U.S. Census Bureau microdata that cover
1982 to 2012. The primary source of data is the Census of Retail Trade (CRT), which
provides revenue by product type for retail stores in years ending in 2 and 7. The CRT
data on product-level revenue and information on the location of each store are used to
define which stores compete with each other. Importantly, a store’s local competition will
include stores in many different industries inside the retail sector, because stores of different
industries can sell similar products. This is particularly evident for stores in the General
Merchandising sub-sector, composed by establishments selling multiple product types. The
data we create here are uniquely equipped to deal with cross-industry competition.
The CRT is combined with the Longitudinal Business Data (LBD) to identify the activity
of stores of each firm in other sectors of the economy. This information assists in tracking
the behavior of firms with a presence in retail in manufacturing, wholesaling, and other
sectors of the economy.
1.3.2 Sample Construction
The retail sector is defined based on the North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) as stores with a 2-digit NAICS code of 44 or 45. As such it includes stores that
sell final goods to consumers without performing any transformation of materials. For 1992
to 2012 we use the 8-digit industry codes (NAICS) available from the CRT as the industry
of store. Prior to 1992 we use the 6-digit industry codes (NAICS) from Fort and Klimek
(2016).
The sample includes all stores with at least one employee assigned to the retail sector. The
number of stores increases over time, while the number of firms decreases. Employment
increases over time representing about 10 percent of U.S. employment over the whole sample
period. The retail sector is estimated to account for about 5.5 percent of GDP by the BEA
in 2007.
10We use store and establishment as synonyms.
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1.3.3 Creation of Department-Level Revenue
The CRT asks establishments to provide data on revenue by product line (for example,
men’s footwear, women’s pants, diamond jewelry). Unlike in other sectors of the economy,
retail stores compete with stores in other industries. In particular, general merchandise
stores such as Walmart and Target, compete with stores in clothing, groceries, and elec-
tronics. By 2007, general merchandisers accounted for a significant fraction of sales in many
of these departments. For example, general merchandisers accounted for 44 percent of cloth-
ing sales in 2007 (CRT, 2007). Thus, revenue by product line is important when looking
at competition in the retail sector. The product line codes are aggregated into 20 depart-
ments such that stores in industries outside of general merchandise sell primarily in one
department. For instance, stores in subsector 448 (clothing and clothing accessory stores)
primarily report sales in products such as women’s dress pants, men’s suits, and footwear,
which are grouped into a clothing department. Table B.1.2 lists these departments.
Aggregating data in this allows for accurately imputing revenue by department for stores
that do not report product line data. The CRT only asks for detailed product lines from
a sample of small stores. For the remainder, store-level revenue estimates are constructed
from administrative data, without revenue by product line. This affects stores that account
for 20 percent of sales. For these stores, the distribution of their sales across departments are
imputed using characteristics of the store, such as industry and multi-unit status. Details
of this procedure are provided in Appendix B.1.1.
1.4 Changes in Retail Concentration
This section exploits the detailed micro data described in Section 3.2 to decompose national
concentration in the U.S. retail sector into local and cross-market concentration using the
identity developed in equation (1.3). In doing so, we calculate a new measure of concen-
tration that accounts for the local nature of competition in retail and the rise of general
merchandisers that compete with stores across multiple subsectors. This new measure has
a distinct advantage in that it measures concentration at the product category level, rather
than the industry level. We show that local concentration has increased, although not as
much as national concentration. Moreover, the decomposition reveals that national con-
centration is largely independent of local trends, with 98 percent of the growth in national
concentration accounted by increasing cross-market concentration (consumers shopping at
the same firms across markets).
Figure 1.2 plots national concentration in the U.S. retail sector as measured by the HHI
10
defined in equation (1.1). Between 1982 and 1997 national concentration was low, although
it gradually increased over the period. In contrast, between 1997 and 2007, concentration
grew at a faster pace, more than doubling from 0.02 to 0.055. These results are consistent
with previous work documenting increasing national industry-level concentration in sales
and employment across sectors, including retail.11
Figure 1.2: National Concentration
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Notes: The data are from the CRT micro data set. Weighted averages of national HHI in eight major
departments were computed.
Striking as it is, the increase in national concentration shows only part of the changes un-
dergone by the retail sector during the past decades. Figure 1.2 alone does not provide
information on the mechanisms underlying the change in national concentration. In partic-
ular, it does not account for what has happened to local retail markets. To determine the
evolution of local concentration and its relation to national concentration we exploit the
data constructed in Section 3.2 and implement the decomposition described in Section 1.2.
Figure 1.3 plots the level of national and local concentration between 1982 and 2007. Local
11See Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2019); Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and Van Reenen (2017);
Foster, Haltiwanger, Klimek, Krizan and Ohlmacher (2015); Basker, Klimek and Hoang Van (2012).
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Figure 1.3: National and Local Concentration
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Notes: The data are from the CRT micro data set. The eight main departments are weighted by sales share.
The local HHI is aggregated using each market’s share of national sales.
concentration increases whether markets are defined by zip codes, counties, or commut-
ing zones, and are sustained throughout the sample period, with the exception of the mid
1990’s.12 Contrary to the national concentration index, local concentration did not acceler-
ate its increase in the period after 1997. These results imply that if market power has been
increasing, the increases are much more modest than those implied by national data.13
The picture that emerges from the data in the present study differs from the findings of
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2019) (RST), who find that local retail concentration
has been steadily falling since 1992. Our results differ for multiple reasons. First, a different
data set is used.14 Second, different definitions of which stores are retailers are employed.
12These results are consistent with studies on labor market concentration that find increasing concentration
in retail, but decreasing concentration overall (Rinz, 2018; Lipsius, 2018).
13Local concentration may be correlated with market power, but local concentration measured by revenue
can increase in response to large firms lowering their prices. Thus, the increases in local concentration may
not imply decreases in welfare.
14RST use U.S. NETS data.
12
RST use Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes while this paper uses NAICS.15
Finally, the aggregate index of local HHI is calculated differently. RST report the average
change in the local HHI, weighting by the end-of-period sales/employment of each market,
while we report the change in the average local HHI, weighting markets in each year accord-
ing to that year’s sales. This distinction matters because as markets become bigger, they
also tend to become less concentrated. This mechanically gives more weight to markets
where concentration is decreasing. In fact, when we repeat our exercise using end-of-period
weights we find small decreases in local concentration when measured at the industry or
product level. The results are presented in appendix A.1. We choose current period weights
in order to be able to decompose national concentration as described in section 1.2. More
details on differences between our studies are in appendix A.1.
Table 1.1: Collocation Term by Year
Department 1997 2007
Furniture 0.012 0.013
Electronics and Appliances 0.015 0.013
Home and Garden 0.009 0.009
Groceries 0.012 0.012
Health Goods 0.012 0.011
Clothing 0.015 0.016
Toys 0.011 0.009
Sporting Goods 0.013 0.016
Notes: The data are from the CRT micro data
set. Collocation is the probability that two dollars
chosen at random are spent in the same market. It
measures the contribution of local concentration
to national concentration. Markets are defined as
commuting zones.
Having measured local concentration for each market and product category it is now possible
to measure the relation between local and national concentration. We do this by means
of the decomposition in equation (1.3), which breaks national concentration into local and
cross-market concentration. The first result is the limited effect of local concentration on
national concentration. The contribution of local concentration to national concentration
is weighted by the collocation term—the probability that two dollars spent in the U.S.
are spent in the same market, shown in Table 1.1 for the eight major product categories.
15The primary difference between SIC and NAICS is that SIC includes restaurants in retail.
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Because the share of any given market in total U.S. retail sales is small (given the number
of markets in the U.S.), the collocation term is quite small. This probability is less than 2
percent for all departments and all years, and has barely changed over time. As a result, a
10 percentage point increase in the local HHI will increase the national HHI by less than
0.2 percentage points. Moreover, the collocation term shows that in the extreme case where
every market had only one firm, implying the local HHI is one, the national HHI would be
less than two percent if each firm was only in one market.
The second result is the major role of cross-market concentration in shaping the national
concentration index, this comes as the flip-side of the limited role of local concentration.
National concentration has increased because consumers in different locations are shopping
at the same (large) firms, in fact, 98 percent of the change in national concentration reported
in Figure 1.2 is accounted for by changes in cross-market concentration. The probability
that two dollars spent in the same product category are spent at the same firm in two
different markets increased from around 2 percent to 5.5 percent in just 10 years (from 1997
to 2007). Put another way, product-level concentration increased from the level implied by
100 equal-sized firms to the number implied by 20 equal-sized firms. On the other hand,
the probability two dollars spent in the same market are spent at the same firm increased
from 7.8 percent to 11.7 percent, an increase of 50 percent.16
The Department of Justice merger guidelines consider a market to be highly concentrated
if the HHI exceeds 0.25 and moderately concentrated if the HHI exceeds 0.15 (Justice and
Commision, 2010). We find that the average retail market is just below the threshold for
moderate concentration when markets are defined as a commuting zone. Markets measured
by zip codes and counties are highly and moderately concentrated, respectively. We find
similar results using the share of the top four firms in each product category. We find that
in 1987 the top four firms in a commuting zone accounted for 4.4 percent of all sales in a
department. By 1997 this share increased by 3.5 percentage points to 7.9 percent of sales.
In the next 10 years the share of the top four firms grew by 7.2 percentage points to 15.1
percent.
These results show how markets have changed on average, but they miss large changes in
the underlying distribution of concentration at the local level. The next section focuses on
exactly those changes.
16Unless otherwise stated local concentration numbers refer to markets defined as commuting zones. Com-
muting zones are such that the majority of individuals work and live inside the same one. It seems likely
that if individuals live and work in a commuting zone they do the majority of their shopping in that region.
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Figure 1.4: Changes in Concentration Across Markets
(a) Unweighted
0
.1
.2
.3
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 M
ar
ke
ts
<-0.3 -0.3 to -0.2 -0.2 to -0.1 -0.1 to -0.05 -0.05 to 0 0 to 0.05 0.05 to 0.1 0.1 to 0.2 0.2 to 0.3 >0.3
Change in the HHI between 1997 and 2007
(b) Weighted
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 D
oll
ar
s
<-0.3 -0.3 to -0.2 -0.2 to -0.1 -0.1 to -0.05 -0.05 to 0 0 to 0.05 0.05 to 0.1 0.1 to 0.2 0.2 to 0.3 >0.3
Change in the HHI between 1997 and 2007
Notes: The data are from the CRT micro data set. Left panel shows the fraction of markets, commuting
zone/product category pairs, with changes in concentration of a given size. The right panel weights markets
by value of sales in the department.
1.5 Variation in Local Concentration
This section delves deeper into the changes in local concentration experienced by markets
in the U.S. during the last decades. As mentioned above, local concentration has risen on
average since 1982, yet this general trend provides little information for how the change in
concentration is distributed across markets. Using our detailed data on revenue by product
for U.S. establishments we show that the increases in concentration were broad based across
both products and locations.
1.5.1 Changes in Concentration Across Locations
The increases in concentration have been very broad-based. Over 72 percent of dollars
spent in 2007 are spent in markets which have increased concentration since 1992. Figure
1.4 shows the distribution of changes in concentration between 1997 and 2007. In just 10
years 52 percent of markets had increases in concentration over 5 percentage points and
32 percent of dollars were spent in markets with an increase of at least this size. These
changes are significant. One criterion used by the Department of Justice to determine when
to challenge mergers is whether the local HHI will increase by 2 percentage points, if the
market is already highly concentrated (HHI over 25 percent).
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1.5.2 Changes in Concentration Across Products
Changes in local concentration were also broad-based across products. Figure 1.5 shows
that concentration increased for seven of the 8 major product categories. Although there is
significant variation across products in terms of the level of the local HHI and the change.
While some products, like electronics, home goods and toys, experience large increases in
concentration, more than doubling the local HHI in the decade from 1997 to 2007, some
others, like furniture and groceries barely increase.
Figure 1.5: Changes in Local Concentration Across Product Categories
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1.6 Issues with Industry-Based Measures
A central contribution of this paper is the creation of store-level sales by product category
for all U.S. retail stores. This allows us to define competition based on products rather
than industry-based measures. Industries, either NAICS or SIC codes, are regularly used
to define markets. This approach is often necessitated by data availability and in many
sectors is likely to be a good approximation (e.g. manufacturing).
This is not the case in the retail sector. The retail sector has one set of industries, general
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merchandise stores (NAICS 452), that compete with stores in many industries. By con-
struction these industries are composed by establishment that sell many types of products.
Thus, industry-based measures ignore the competition faced by stores selling a given prod-
uct, coming from general merchandise stores. The measures we developed in Section 1.4
overcome this shortcoming.
Table 1.2 presents industry-based and product-based concentration measures. There are
two industry-based measures, the first one (NAICS-based) calculates concentration sepa-
rately for all 6-digit industries in NAICS, while the second one (Selcect NAICS) calculates
concentration for all 6-digit NAICS excluding auto dealers and auto-parts stores (441),
gasoline stations (447), and non-store retailers (454). The product-based measure calcu-
lates concentration for the eight major product categories discussed in Section 1.5. As
discussed above, each measure captures different concepts, as they define a market in a
different way. These differences are more than just conceptual. The level of the different
measures gives a different picture of how concentrated markets are. Product-based mea-
sures are about a third of the Select NAICS measure and half of the NAICS-based measure
with all industries.17 Despite their differences all measures of concentration exhibit similar
dynamics, with national concentration measures increasing five- to six-fold since 1982, and
local concentration measures roughly doubling.
17The differences in level across concentration measures cross the different thresholds for concentration
establish by the Justice Department.
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Table 1.2: Industry-Based and Product-Based Concentration Measures
National Concentration
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
NAICS-based 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.046 0.085 0.105 0.116
Select NAICS 0.030 0.043 0.046 0.080 0.143 0.182 0.195
Product-based 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.041 0.055
Local Concentration - Commuting zone
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
NAICS-based 0.120 0.143 0.143 0.160 0.203 0.226 0.246
Select NAICS 0.155 0.184 0.191 0.222 0.279 0.313 0.326
Product-based 0.059 0.071 0.086 0.078 0.102 0.117
Notes: All concentration mesures correspond to average Herfindahl-Hirschman
indeces. NAICS-based measures are calculated including all NAICS industries.
Select NAICS drops subsectors 441, 447, and 454. Product-based measures cal-
culate concentration for eight major product categories. Product-based measures
for commuting zones in 2012 have not been disclosed.
1.7 Conclusion
Despite the attention given to the rise of national concentration in the U.S., less is known
about the dynamics of local concentration, and the relationship between observed national
trends and the behavior of local markets. Knowing the state and dynamics of local concen-
tration is of particular importance in the retail sector due to the local nature of most retail
markets during most of the last three decades. This paper helps to shed light on these issues
by contributing in two related fronts. First, we develop analytical tools that relate local and
national concentration. Our tools allow us to decompose national concentration measures
into a local component (national concentration rises as local markets become more con-
centrated), and a cross-market component (national concentration rises as the same firms
are present in more markets, increasing their national market share). Second, we construct
new data from confidential Census micro-data that allow us to measure concentration at a
granular level. With this data we can define a market as a pair of a geographical location
(e.g. a commuting zone), and a product. This data not only leads to new measures of
product-based local concentration, but, in combination with the decomposition we propose,
it also gives a clear picture of the mechanisms behind the increase in national concentration
in the retail sector.
We show that local concentration has a limited effect on national concentration measures,
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even though concentration increases broadly across locations and products since the 1980’s.
Instead, it is cross-market concentration what explains most of the increase in national
concentration observed since 1982. That is, national concentration is driven by consumers
in different markets (locations) shopping at the same firms, highlighting the role of large
multi-market retailers in explaining the dynamics of the retail market.
The unique data we construct also overcomes a drawback of previous measures of con-
centration, namely, the reliance in industry-based measures. By exploiting information on
product-line sales we can define markets based on products. This makes it possible to
capture competition across industries, a salient feature of retail markets due to the rise of
general merchandise stores. This type of competition is ignored by industry-based mea-
sures, which cannot account for the competition faced by clothing or grocery stores, coming
from general merchandisers. We show that this conceptual difference in the definition of
markets (by industry or by product) lead to very different levels of concentration, with
product-based measures being between a third and half of industry based measures, at
both the national and the local level. However, all measures have similar upward trends,
with national measures increasing by five- to six-fold and local measures roughly doubling.
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Chapter 2
Foreign Sourcing and the U.S.
Retail Sector
2.1 Introduction
In the past 30 years, U.S. retailing has become substantially more concentrated. Between
1997 and 2007, the share of sales going to the 20 largest firms increased from 18.5 percent
to 25.4 (Hortac¸su and Syverson, 2015). During this same time period the number of stores
of small retail firms decreased by seven percent. This pattern appears to be part of an
economy-wide trend toward greater ownership concentration (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson
and Van Reenen, 2017) and an increase in the dominance of large, established firms (Decker,
Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2014). These increases in concentration are accompanied
by steeply rising variable markups (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Hall, 2018), which raise
concerns about rising market power and prices.
Despite the consensus that large firms account for a growing share of activity, we lack an
understanding of why this reallocation has occurred. One possibility is globalization. The
growth of large U.S. retailers coincided with the period during which imports of consumer
goods from China increased five-fold. Many of these consumer goods were imported by
large retailers (Holmes and Singer, 2018) at significant marginal cost savings over smaller
retailers that used intermediaries (Ganapati, 2018). While existing research finds that
Chinese imports have led to lower prices and increased varieties for consumers, those imports
disproportionately favor large U.S. retailers.1 If Chinese imports have led to increased
concentration in retail, this might mitigate—or eventually even reverse—the benefits of
lower-priced consumer goods from China for U.S. consumers.
1See Amiti, Dai, Feenstra and Romalis (2017); Jaravel and Sager (2018); Handley and Lima˜o (2017)
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In this paper, the role of direct imports from China in the transformation of the retail sector
is examined using data on store-level revenue for all U.S. retailers in 20 major categories
of goods. The data allow for the construction of a store-level measure of exposure to
direct imports based on the importing activity of a store’s local competitors. I use these
data to explore the causal impact of imports on the exit decisions of stores of small firms,
documenting that increasing exposure to direct imports leads to the exit of small stores.
Trade can explain the exit of small stores because the fixed costs of trade are large (Antras,
Fort and Tintelnot, 2017). Large retailers pay these fixed costs and buy much of what they
sell directly from foreign suppliers, while small retailers pay higher costs to purchase through
intermediaries. Large retailers, defined as firms with more than 100 stores, are responsible
for more than 90 percent of total imports by retailers and have been linked to much of the
growth in consumer goods imports from China (Basker and Van, 2010). Existing work has
documented that competition with large retailers causes small retailers to exit.2 Meinen
and Raff (2018) show that small stores exit and local concentration increases in industries
where retailers directly import more of the products they sell. Yet, these estimates rely on
import exposure measures at the industry-level, which have the potential to miss important
features of trade because some of the biggest importers are general merchandisers, who
compete with stores in other industries.
In this study, detailed data on sales by product category are combined with data on firm
imports by these same product categories. This allows for the construction of a measure of
each store’s exposure to trade based on which products each store sells and the actions of
their local competitors. I test whether stores that become more exposed to direct imports
between 2002 and 2007 are more likely to exit the market. This is accomplished while
controlling for the size and scope of each store’s competitors. An issue in this exercise
is that increases in exposure to direct imports are correlated with increased competition
from large firms. Increased competition from large firms may cause small stores to exit for
reasons unrelated to direct imports. This fact can lead to biased estimates of the effect of
direct imports on small store exit.
These concerns are addressed using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy similar to Hum-
mels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang (2014). The instrument uses growth of China’s exports
by product category between 2002 and 2007. The IV identify stores that become more
exposed to direct imports because of increases in exports from China in products already
imported by their competitors in 2002. The change in import exposure of each store is
calculated by assuming that product-level imports by each store’s competitors grow at the
2See Jia (2008), Arcidiacono et al. (2016), Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Krizan (2010), Basker (2005)
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rate of exports from China of that product. The instrument depends on the assumption
that firms already importing in 2002 did not experience a simultaneous increase in com-
petitiveness due to other factors in the same products in which exports from China grew.
Results show that a one percentage point increase in the share of competitor’s sales that
are imported directly is associated with an increased exit rate of small stores by 0.7-1.7
percentage points.
The most similar paper to this one is work by Meinen and Raff (2018). They use data
on Dutch retailers to show that retailers becoming importers is positively associated with
higher sales, profits, and markups. This paper advances on their work in two key respects.
First, I focus on the intensive margin of importing decisions, while Meinen and Raff (2018)
focus on the effect of a firm becoming an importer. I show that the retail firms that
begin importing between 1997 and 2007 are small, account for a small fraction of aggregate
sales, and import a small fraction of their sales directly. Thus, I studying the impact of
large retailers increasing their direct import penetration over the time period. Second, I
measure each store’s exposure to trade based on which product categories the store and its
competitors sell. This is an improvement over traditional industry-based measures because
it accounts for the fact that within firm there is significant variation in product category
import penetration.
This work contributes to ongoing research on the role of foreign sourcing by studying how it
impacts the decisions of retail firms. Previous work has shown that retailers play an impor-
tant role in imports from China (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott, 2010). Ganapati
(2018) shows that intermediary markups can be substantial, which implies the marginal
cost savings of importing directly can be large. The focus of this paper is on the domestic
impact of direct imports by large firms on small retailers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 lays out a model of retailer importing.
Section 2.3 describes the data, including how to construct store-level sales by product and
import exposure. Section 2.4 provides descriptive evidence on the importance of importing
to the retail sector. Section 2.5 provides estimates of the impact of direct imports on entry,
exit, and growth in the retail sector. The final section concludes.
2.2 Model of Importing and Local Market Entry
In this section I lay out a model of retailer entry and look at the effect of imports on entry
and exit decisions. There are two types of firms: single-unit and large firms. The firms
differ in terms of their profit functions.
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The model delivers two results. First, a fall in trade costs leads large firms to import more,
expand into more markets, and earn higher profits in existing markets. Second, a fall in
trade costs single unit firms earn lower profits and exit. The effect of these competing
forces on competition is ambiguous and depends on the extent to which stores of large firms
replace stores of small firms.
2.2.1 Model Setup
Firms play a static entry game in M markets. Markets differ in terms of a characteristic,
xm ∈ X ⊂ R, such as population. A firm of type t ∈ {S,L} must pay an entry cost ft > 0
to enter a market. The profits of a firm of type t, pit(x, c,NS , NL, cL, ), depend on the
firm’s marginal cost c, the number of firms of each type (NS , NL), the marginal cost of
the large firm (cL), the marginal cost of small firms (cS), the firm’s productivity (), and
the productivity of all other firms (~). I make the following assumptions about the profit
functions
Assumption 1 Each pit satisfies the following conditions
1. pit is increasing in x and 
2. pit is decreasing in c,NS , NL
3. piS is increasing in cL
4. pit is continuous and differentiable in all variables
The first assumption states that the characteristics of a market are defined such that they are
desirable and that more productive firms are more profitable. The second assumption states
that having higher costs or more competitors has a negative effect on profits. The third
assumption states that small firms are substitutes with large firms. The fourth asusmption
is made for convenience in proofs.
There are E = {ES , EL} firms of each type that could enter each market. I order firms of
each type s1, s2, . . . , sS and l1, l2, . . . , lL by  such that s > s+1 and l > l+1.
An equilibrium is a cutoff rule for ˆmS and ˆmL which implies a number of firms of each
type (NˆmS , NˆmL) such that such that the following conditions are satisfied:
piS(xm, c, NˆmS , NˆmL, cL, NˆmS ) ≥ 0
piS(xm, c, NˆmS + 1, NˆmL, cL, NˆmS+1) < 0
piL(xm, c, NˆmS , NˆmL, cL, NˆmL) ≥ 0
piL(xm, c, NˆmS , NˆmL + 1, cL, NˆmL+1) < 0
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To avoid multiple equilibria I assume large firms enter first, followed by small firms. This
timing assumption is for convenience. It ensures that when I compare equilibria before and
after large firms start importing the differences are caused by changes in parameters instead
of changes in the equilibrium I select. Given this assumption there is a unique equilibrium.
2.2.2 Testable Hypothesis
I consider comparative statics with respect to the marginal cost of large firms. An increase
in direct importing lowers the marginal cost from cL to cI < cL. The results are proven in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 ˆmS is non-decreasing in cL and non-increasing in NL.
Proof Let cL < c
′
L and ˆmS be the cutoff rule with cL then by assumption pi
S(x, c,Ns, NL, cL, ) <
piS(x, c,Ns, NL, c
′
L, ) for all . In particular for  ≥ ˆmS it must be that 0 ≤ piS(x, c,Ns, NL, cL, ) <
piS(x, c,Ns, NL, c
′
L, ). The proof for NL is the same.
Proposition 2 Let {ˆmS , ˆmL}Mm=1 be an equilibrium where both types of firms have marginal
cost c and {¯mS , ¯mL}Mm=1 be an equilibrium with importing then the following conditions
must hold
1. ¯mL ≥ ˆmL for all m
2. ¯mS ≤ ˆmS for all m
Proof By proposition 1 ¯mS ≤ ˆmS for all m which implies N¯mS ≤ NˆmS . Then by assump-
tion 1 for  ≥ ˆmS
piL(x, cI , N¯mS , NˆmL, cI , ) ≥> piL(x, cL, NˆmS , NˆmL, cL, ) ≥ 0
this implies that ¯mS ≤ ˆmS for all m.
These propositions deliver testable implications. They imply that a fall in trade costs should
1. Lead to the expansion of large firms.
2. Lead to the exit of stores of small firms.
These implications are tested in section 2.5.
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2.3 Data: Retailer Revenue and Importing
This section describes the new data on store-level revenue in 20 product categories, which
are combined with firm-level imports in these same product categories. These data allow
for the construction of detailed measures of which stores compete with each other and the
exposure of each store to direct imports.3
2.3.1 Data Description
This paper combines two primary sources of confidential U.S. Census Bureau microdata
that cover 1992 to 2007, the time period during which imports of consumer goods grew
substantially. The primary source of data is the Census of Retail Trade (CRT), which
provides revenue by product type for retail establishments in years ending in 2 and 7. The
CRT data are used to construct store-level revenue by 20 categories of goods called product
categories. I use these data on revenue and information on the location of each store to
define which stores compete with each other. Importantly, a store’s local competition will
include stores in many different industries. Store-level measures are combined with data on
the activity of the firm that owns each store. In particular, information is tracked on how
many stores each firm operates in each year and the trading activity of each firm.
The Longitudinal Foreign Trade and Transactions Database (LFTTD) is used for the col-
lection of data on the imports of each retailer. These data contain the value of each firm’s
imports by source country and harmonized system (HS) code on a yearly basis. These data
are used to construct firm-level imports in each product category.
The CRT and LFTTD are combined with the Longitudinal Business Data (LBD) to identify
the activity of stores of each firm in other sectors of the economy. This information assists
in the definition of a retail firm.
2.3.2 Sample Construction
A retail firm is defined as one that has at least 50 percent of its employment in retail and
at least one store in the CRT.4 The retail sector is defined based on the North Ameri-
can Industrial Classification System (NAICS) using the codes created by Fort and Klimek
(2016). Three subsectors (3-digit NAICS codes) are removed: auto dealers and part stores
3I use store, shop, and establishment as synonyms.
4Almost all firms with any employment in retail have almost all of their employment in that sector.
Unlike in manufacturing the biggest retailers are almost exclusively retail firms.
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(441), gasoline stations (447), and non-store retailers (454).5 The first two are removed
because they have a large degree of franchising. Franchises are typically required to buy the
products they sell at fixed prices from a parent company. Thus, any imports they sell come
through a parent company and cannot be identified in the LFTTD.6 Non-store retailers
are removed because they reach consumers primarily through the internet and catalogs.
This prevents identifying in which markets they sell their products. The non-store retail
sector accounted for less than 10 percent of sales in all eight of the major product categories
prior to 2007, the final year of this study. This leaves eight subsectors: furniture and home
furnishings stores (442); electronics and appliances stores (443); home goods and gardening
stores (444); food and grocery stores (445); health goods stores (446); clothing and apparel
stores (448); toy, hobby, and sporting goods stores (451); general merchandise stores (452);
and miscellaneous store retailers (453).
Retail firms are partitioned into three types: large firms, small chains, and single units.
Large firms are defined as firms with more than 100 stores in the retail sector. These firms
typically operate in many markets and have many more than 100 stores.7 Small chains have
between 2 and 99 stores. The majority of stores of small chains belong to firms with fewer
than 10 stores. Single unit firms have only one store in the retail sector. Small chains and
single unit firms are collectively refferred to here as small firms. I will refer to the type of
stores based on the type of the firm to which they belong.
2.3.3 Creation of Revenue by Product Category
The CRT asks establishments to provide data on revenue by product line (for example,
men’s footwear, women’s pants, diamond jewelry). Unlike in other sectors of the economy,
retail stores compete with stores in other industries. In particular, general merchandise
stores such as Walmart and Target, compete with stores in groceries and electronics. Thus,
revenue by product line is important when looking at competition in the retail sector. The
product line codes are aggregated into 20 product categories such that stores in industries
outside of general merchandise sell primarily in one product category. For instance, stores
in subsector 448 (clothing and clothing accessory stores) primarily report sales in products
such as women’s dress pants, men’s suits, and footwear, which are grouped into a clothing
product category. Table B.1.2 lists these product categories.
5The subsectors in my sample account for 58 percent of total NAICS-based retail sales in 2007 or $2.2
trillion in sales.
6Additionally, forces that benefit large firms, such as improvements in communication technology are
unlikely to help franchises in the same way, making them unsuitable as a control group.
7Table 2.1 shows that the average large firm has over 600 stores in 2007. For comparison Walmart
reported it operated about 4,000 stores in its 2007 Annual Report.
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Aggregating data in this allows for accurately imputing revenue by product category for
stores that do not report product line data. The CRT only asks for detailed product
lines from a sample of small stores. For the remainder, store-level revenue estimates are
constructed from administrative data, without revenue by product line. This affects stores
accounting for 20 percent of sales. For these stores, the distribution of their sales across
product categories are imputed using characteristics of the store, such as industry and
multi-unit status. Details of this procedure are provided in Appendix B.1.1.
2.3.4 Creation of Imports by Product Category
The product category revenue data are then combined with imports by product category
from the LFTTD. The HS codes provided in the data are mapped to product categories.
This is accomplished by updating the concordance from Basker and Van (2010) using data
on which products retailers import. The concordance is constructed such that almost all
products retailers import map to a product category. The HS codes that can be mapped to
a product category are called consumer goods HS codes.8 Details are provided in Appendix
B.1.2.
Imports by product category are matched with firm-level sales by product category to get
import penetration by product category for each firm. It is important to define import
penetration by product category because of the existence of significant variation in import
penetration across product categories within a firm. For example, a firm may import almost
all of its clothing directly, but not import any groceries. This variation makes it feasible to
separately control for competition with large firms and competition with direct imports.
2.4 Increasing Importance of Large Retailers
Large firms are increasingly dominating the retail sector. This section shows some statistics
quantifying the size of these changes with a specific focus on the entry and exit of stores of
different size firms. Then it describes the importing behavior of retailers arguing that
2.4.1 Expansion and Exit
The difference between national and local concentration is driven by large firms’ extensive
margin decisions to enter new markets. Table 2.1 shows that between 1997 and 2007 the
8Proceeding in this way causes me to overstate consumer goods imports by non-retailers. For example, if
some retailers import desks, I classify all desks as consumer goods imports, though some desks are imported
by wholesalers for sale to businesses or government entities. This only affects statistics on the fraction of
consumer goods imports by retailers.
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number of stores of large retailers increased significantly as large retailers expanded into
new markets while many small stores exited.
Table 2.1: Number of Stores by Firm Type
Stores
Firm Type 1997 2007 Percent Change
Single Unit 409,655 392,027 -4
Small Chains 107,811 89,042 -17
Large Firms 177,139 220,222 24
Total 694,605 701,291 1
Firms
Single-Unit 409,655 392,027 -4
Small Chains 21,432 17,209 -17
Large Firms 368 349 -5
Total 431,455 409,585 -5
Notes: The figures come from author calculations using the
public CRT. They represent the sum of subsectors 442, 443,
444, 445, 446, 448, 451, 452, and 453, and include single-unit
firms (with one store), small chains (with 2 - 99 stores), and
large firms (with 100+ stores).
The fact that the number of stores by large firms increased by 24 percent, but the number
of large firms was essentially unchanged, decreasing from 368 to 349, implies the increase
in stores of large firms was caused by an increasing number of stores per large firm. Fur-
thermore, these new stores were built in new markets. In 1997, the average large firm had
stores in 114 commuting zone. This number increased by 26 percent to 145 by 2007. As
these large firms expanded, smaller stores exited. In particular, the number of small chains
decreased by 17 percent. On average, single-unit stores also exited, but the decrease was
much smaller. The number of single-unit stores decreased by four percent.
2.5 Direct Imports and the Retail Sector
Evidence is now presented concerning a link between direct importing and increasing con-
centration. First, the increase in imports between 1997 and 2007 is quantified. Second,
changes in the share of large firms are related to direct imports, with mixed results. Fi-
nally, it is demonstrated that small stores exposed to competition from direct imports are
more likely to exit.
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This subsection establishes a few relevant patterns in the data. First, I establish the im-
porting directly is a behavior that is undertaken primarily by the largest retail firms, with
the smaller firms that do import importing only a small fraction of their sales. This is
used as justification for the assumption that small firms cannot import. Second, I show the
importance of China in retailer imports and argue that focusing on imports from China is
good.
This paper focuses on imports of consumer goods from China for two reasons. First, China
has been the main source of retailer imports for the last 20 years. Second, most of the
growth in consumer goods imports in the 2000s was accounted for by increasing imports
from China. Table 2.2 shows the top sources of retailer imports ranked by value and by
number of retail firms that import from a country. China is consistently ranked number
one by value of imported products, although Canada have more firms importing from it.
Table 2.2: Countries by Rank
Rank by:
Value Firm
China 1 2
Italy 2 3
Canada 3 1
India 4 6
Indonesia 5 17
Notes:
The second fact that I exploit is that only the largest retailers.
2.5.1 Direct Imports and Expansion of Large Firms
Imports by retailers increased drastically between 1997 and 2007, as did imports by non-
retailers of consumer goods. Table 2.3 shows the change in imports of consumer goods
from all countries and from China in particular. Total imports of consumer goods increased
from 538 billion to 1.2 trillion U.S. dollars between 1997 and 2007. Imports from China
accounted for 40 percent of this increase. Twenty percent of imports from China were by
retailers and over 90 percent of those imports were by large firms.
Large retailers directly import a significant fractions of their sales. Table 2.4 shows imports
of large firms divided by sales of large firms by department. Between 1997 and 2007 large
firms significantly increased the fraction of sales imported directly in departments such as
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Table 2.3: Imports of Consumer Goods
1992 1997 2002 2007
Total Consumer Goods Imports 319 538 794 1,192
Imports from China 23 55 124 316
Retailer Imports from China 6 13 27 62
Large Retailer Imports from China 5 12 25 57
Notes: The data are from the LFTTD micro data set. Consumer goods are
defined as HS codes that map to a retail department using the procedure
described in Appendix B.1.3. The values are in billions of 2007 U.S. dollars.
furniture, toys, electronics and appliances, and clothing. Imports are particularly important
in departments such as clothing and clothing accessories, where by 2007 they represented
17 percent of all sales. This translates to more than 35 percent of cost of goods sold.9 This
is in share contrast to the grocery store subsector, where imports are less than one percent
of sales.
Table 2.4: Share of Large Firm Sales Imported Directly
1997 2007
Clothing 10.3 16.2
Electronics and Appliances 5.0 12.5
Furniture 11.6 47.8
Groceries 0.1 0.4
Health Goods 0.4 0.6
Home Goods 2.7 7.4
Sporting Goods 7.3 10.0
Toys 16.4 30.1
Notes: The figures represent total imports by
large firms in a department divided by total sales
by large firms in that department multiplied by
100.
A key challenge in relating the expansion of large retailers to importing is that large retail-
ers often sell many products. For example, during the 1990s and 2000s Walmart opened
thousands of supercenters selling groceries, clothing, and other goods. The entirety of this
9Cost of goods sold is typically 60 percent of sales, but includes spending on domestic transportation and
other domestic costs of foreign goods. Thus, the sales share of imported goods should be at least twice the
ratio of value of imports to sales.
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expansion was surely not due to direct imports—Walmart’s expansion started well before
the increase in direct imports.10 Additionally, other large retailers such as CVS and Wal-
greens added thousands of stores despite a relatively low degree of direct importing.
I investigated whether large firms that sold products exposed to direct imports expanded
between 1997 and 2007 and found mixed results. First, I compared the change in the share
of sales going to large firms to the share of sales imported directly. The results are plotted
in Figure 2.1. Six departments followed a clear pattern: that larger increases in the share
of sales imported directly are related to increasing share of sales by large firms. However,
there are two major exceptions, toys and furniture. Toys began as the most concentrated
department with 84 percent of sales by large firms so even if imports had a large effect
there was very little room for growth. In contrast, furniture is the department with the
lowest share of sales by large firms. It is also the department where large firms account for
the smallest share of total imports. Many small furniture firms import. This may imply
large retailers have less of a marginal cost advantage in furniture. Thus, the evidence of a
relationship between changes in direct import share and changes in the share of large firms
depends on the product in question.
2.5.2 Direct Imports and Exit of Small Stores
There has been considerable research undertaken linking the exit of small stores to compe-
tition with Big-Box stores and Walmart in particular.11 A main contribution of this current
research is to assess the role of direct imports as a channel through which large firms cause
the exit of small stores. To do so, the relationship between the exit of small stores and
increasing exposure to direct imports is estimated using data from 2002 and 2007.
To estimate the relationship between competition with direct imports and exit of small
stores a store-level measure of exposure to direct imports is developed. For each small
store, I calculate the fraction of competitors’ sales that are imported directly. Data on both
location and sales by department are used to define competition between stores.
I estimate the effect of changes in import exposure on the probability of exit of small
stores. Regressions are run separately for single-unit stores and small chains because these
two types of stores may face different degrees of competition from imports. In particular,
single-unit stores may sell niche products that are less subject to competition from imports.
The estimating equation is:
10See Basker (2005) or Holmes (2011).
11For example, see Basker (2005); Haltiwanger et al. (2010); Jia (2008); Arcidiacono et al. (2016). I confirm
that in my sample I also find that small stores competing with large retailers are more likely to exit.
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Figure 2.1: Share of Sales by Large Firms vs Direct Import Share - Department-Level
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Notes: The data are from the CRT and LFTTD micro data sets. The fraction imported is the value of
direct imports divided by the value of sales. Sales share of large firms is the sales of firms with more than
100 stores divided by total sales in a department. Changes are calculated between 1997 and 2007.
E2002−2007im = α+ β1∆d
2002−2007
im + β2d
2002
im +XimΓ
′ + εim. (2.1)
E2002−2007im is an indicator of whether store i in market m exits between 2002 and 2007.
∆d2002−2007im is the change in exposure to imports for that store and d
2002
im is the 2002 level
of exposure to direct imports. X contains a number of controls for store characteristics,
market characteristics, and the competitive environment of each store.
The controls for store characteristics include dummy variables for store age and the log of
the store’s 2002 sales. I also include dummy variables for each store’s top department, the
one in which the store has the plurality of its sales. This controls for national demand shocks
to certain departments and differences in the natural rate of turnover of stores based on
what they sell. The controls for market characteristics include the population of the market
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and the change in population of the market between 2002 and 2007. Finally, X contains
controls for the size and scope of the competitors of each store in 2002. The construction
of those controls is described in subsection 2.5.2.
Creation of Direct Import Exposure
The creation of direct import exposure, ∆d2002−2007im , takes place in three steps. The first
step involves calculating firm-department-level import penetration at the national level for
all retailers using the imports of each firm. The second step involves using the distribution
of stores of each firm to create department-market-level import penetration. The final
step is to create store-level import exposure by weighting department-market-level import
penetration using each store’s sales in each department.
First, I calculate firm-department-level import penetration for all retailers. For firm, k, the
fraction of sales in each department, j, in year, t, that are imported directly is
dimpenkjt =
importskjt
saleskjt
. (2.2)
I assume that each firm’s imports in a department are distributed across its stores according
to that store’s share of firm sales in each department. That is, I assume if Walmart imports
10 percent of its clothing directly, 10 percent of the clothing sales of each of its stores are
imported directly.
In the second step, I calculate a measure of direct import penetration in department j in
market m at time t as
dimpenmjt =
K∑
k=1
sjmtk dimpenkjt, (2.3)
where sjmtk is the sales share of firm k in department j in market m in year t.
This market-department-level measure of direct import competition is converted to the
store level by weighting each market-department-level direct import penetration according
to the sales share of that department in the store’s total sales, simtj . k(i) is defined to be the
firm of store i. I remove the contribution of that firm from market-level import penetration
and rescale the shares of the other firms so that direct import penetration is the fraction of
each store’s competitors’ sales that are imported directly. The resulting measure of direct
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import exposure for store i at time t is:
dtim =
J∑
j=1
simtj dimpen
−k(i)
jmt . (2.4)
It is useful to understand how changes in the import exposure measure relate to outcomes
of small stores such as their probability of exit and sales growth between 2002 and 2007.
So I calculate the change in import exposure, ∆d2002−2007im .
Table 2.5 shows summary statistics for both samples in the regression. The average single-
unit store experienced an increase in import exposure of 0.01 from an initial level of 0.012.
The average small chain experienced an increase in import exposure of 0.012 from an initial
level of 0.014. This number may seem small, but it is depressed significantly by a large
number of grocery stores and pharmacies that experienced almost no competition from
direct imports. Thus, the change in exposure to direct imports for clothing, furniture, and
electronics stores is significantly higher.
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics - Exit and Exposure of Small Stores
Single-Unit Small-Chain
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Change in import exposure (∆X2002−2007im ) 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.017
Import exposure (X2002im ) 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014
Exposure to large firms (pctLim) 0.518 0.176 0.535 0.188
Exposure to GMs (pctGMim ) 0.238 0.140 0.249 0.139
Exposure to small chains (pctSCim ) 0.202 0.189 0.192 0.118
Probability of exit (E2002−2007im ) 0.469 0.499 0.356 0.479
Number of observations 488,000 87,000
Notes: Summary statistics are for the sample of single-units and small chains. The observation
count was rounded to the nearest thousand. Unless otherwise indicated, variables are calculated
for the year 2002. Import exposure is the fraction of competitors’ sales that are imported directly.
Exposure to types of firms is the percentage of competitors’ sales that are by a firm of a given
type as described in subsection 2.5.2. Exposure to GMs is the fraction of competitors’ sales by
general merchandise firms. Probability of exit is the probability a store closes between 2002 and
2007.
I expect increases in competition from direct imports to lead to the exit of small stores.
However, an OLS regression of exit on the change in direct import exposure will be biased if
competing firms’ decisions to directly import are correlated with other activities that lower
costs or improve quality. It will also be biased if importers enter markets with stores that
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are likely to exit.
Instrumental Variables Strategy
These concerns about bias are addressed using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. The
IV strategy identifies firms that increased imports because of China’s increase in exports to
other countries.12 Specifically, I used each firm’s 2002 imports by 6-digit HS code combined
with the growth rate of exports from China in that same product code to construct the
change in exposure due to increased exports from China.
In 2002, some retailers in the sample were already importing certain products from China.
Between 2002 and 2007, China’s exports of some of these products grew substantially while
exports of other products did not. This growth had the effect of increasing imports by
some retailers more than others. I exploit the variation in the change in direct import
exposure faced by each store due to growth in China’s exports. The instrument relies on
the assumption that retailers importing products in 2002 that subsequently grew were not
also becoming increasingly competitive for other reasons.
I describe the instrument in two steps. In the first step, I calculate firm-department-level
import penetration in 2007 using the growth of exports from China. In the second step, the
firm-department-level import penetration is converted to a store-level measure of import
exposure using sales share information from 2002.
The measure of import penetration of each firm in a department in 2007 uses the firm’s
imports by six-digit HS code in 2002, the growth rate of Chinese exports to high-income
countries between 2002 and 2007, and the U.S. growth rate of department-level sales between
2002 and 2007. It is calculated as
ˆdimpenkj2007 =
∑HJ
h=1 importskh2002(1 + g
2002−2007
h,CN→HI)
saleskj2002(1 + g
2002−2007
j,US )
. (2.5)
h is an individual 6-digit HS code and g2002−2007h,CN→HI is the growth rate of Chinese exports of
product h to other high-income countries between 2002 and 2007. Hj is the set of HS codes
that are matched to department j using the procedure in Appendix B.1.3. g2002−2007j,US is the
growth rate of all U.S. sales in department j. Thus, the numerator of equation (2.5) is firm
imports in department j in 2007 if imports of each product grew at the rate of China’s
exports. ˆdimpenkj2007 is what each firm’s import penetration in a department would have
been in 2007 had its imports in each product grown at the rate of China’s exports to other
12The other countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and
Switzerland.
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countries and its sales had grown at the rate of national sales.
These measures are combined to calculate each store’s competition from direct imports as
the weighted average of predicted firm-department-level direct import penetration, holding
each store’s competitor’s shares at the 2002 level. Doing so eliminates the effect of entry of
additional importers from the instrument, meaning the instrument only captures intensive
margin changes. The measure is defined as
Z2007im =
J∑
j=1
sim2002j
K∑
k=1
sjm2002k dimpen
j2007
k . (2.6)
The change in Zim is defined as
∆Z2002−2007im = Z
2007
im −X2002im
In the first stage of IV, I estimate the relationship between the change in actual store-level
direct import exposure and the change in exposure due to growth in exports from China.
The specification is
∆d2002−2007im = α+ βt∆Z
2002−2007
im + β1d
2002
im +XimΓ
′
1 + εim, (2.7)
where ∆Z2002−2007im is the change in import exposure using growth of exports from China
and d2002im is the exposure of store i in 2002. The regression contains the same controls as
in equation (2.1).
Controls for Competitors’ Size and Scope
A significant concern with this regression is that exposure to direct imports is correlated
with exposure to large firms. In particular, the locations that are predicted to have larger
increases in exposure between 2002 and 2007 may be the locations with more large firms
in 2002. Controls for competition with small chains and large firms are included for this
reason.
For each store, I define the fraction of sales by competitors that are by small chains (SC)
and large firms (L). For competitor type w ∈ {SC,L} the fraction of sales by competitors
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that belong to firm type w are
pctwim =
J∑
j=1
sim2002j s
jm2002,−k(i)
w , (2.8)
where s
jm2002,−k(i)
w is the share of firms of type w in department j and market m in 2002
with the sales of the firm of i removed. Thus, pctwim takes the share of competitor’s sales
by firms of type w in department j and weights it by the share of department j in store i’s
sales. In these controls, the left out group is single-unit stores. Thus, the coefficients pctLim
and pctGMim represent the impact of competing with a large firm or small chain instead of a
single-unit store.
The control for large firms includes both large firms that primarily sell one type of product
and general merchandisers. I include an additional control for general merchandisers because
general merchandisers may sell products that are more or less substitutable with those sold
by small stores. They also may be more likely to import. Exposure to general merchandisers
is defined as
pctGMim =
J∑
j=1
sim2002j s
jm2002,−k(i)
GM . (2.9)
Large general merchandisers account for almost 100 percent of sales in the general mer-
chandising industry by 2002 so the coefficient on pctGMim essentially measures the difference
in exit probability between competing with a large firm outside of general merchandising
and competing with a large general merchandiser.
I find that most stores already had fairly high exposure to large firms and that increased
significantly over the five years. Table 2.5 shows that in 2002, 52 percent of sales by the
competitors of the average single-unit were by large firms. The number is similar for small
chains. Roughly half of the exposure to large firms comes from general merchandisers.
Specifically, 23.8 percent of the sales of competitors to single-units and 24.9 percent of the
sales of competitors to small chains were by general merchandisers.
OLS and IV Results
Table 2.6 shows that as expected the change in import exposure due to growth in exports
from China is a significant predictor of the actual change in import exposure. Column 1
implies that a one percentage point increase in predicted import exposure is associated with
a 0.18 percentage point increase in actual exposure.
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Table 2.6: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable is the Change in Direct Import Exposure (∆d2002−2007im )
Single-Unit Small Chain
∆Z2002−2007im 0.175*** 0.173***
(0.008) (0.014)
d2002im -0.450*** -0.091*
(0.037) (0.047)
pctLim 0.010*** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.002)
pctGMim -0.015*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
pctSCim 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Log Sales 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y
Market Controls Y Y
R2 0.64 0.66
Observations 488,000 87,000
Notes: ∆Z2002−2007im is the change in import exposure of store i using exports from China.
∆d2002−2007im is the change in direct import exposure of the store between 2002 and 2007.
d2002im is the level of exposure in 2002. pct
w
im is the exposure of store i to firms of type
w ∈ {Large, General Merchandiser, Small-Chain}. Regressions include fixed effects for top
department of each store and for the age of the store. Market controls are the commuting
zone population in 2002 and the change in commuting zone population between 2002 and
2007. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone, top department level. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The observation count is rounded to the nearest
thousand.
Table 2.7 shows results for the main specification for both OLS and IV with the regression
run separately for both types of stores. In the single-unit sample, Positive and significant
coefficients in both OLS and IV were found. The IV results suggest a one percentage point
increase in exposure leads to a 0.78 percentage point increase in the probability of exit of
small stores. Table 2.5 showed 47 percent of single-unit stores exited during this period and
the average change in exposure was one percentage point. Combining these facts indicate
increasing exposure to direct imports explains a small fraction of the exit of single-unit
stores.
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In Table 2.7, column 4 shows that competition with direct imports has a larger effect on
small chains. A one percentage point increase in exposure to direct imports increases the
exit probability of small chains by 1.7 percentage points. This effect is significantly larger
given that the exit probability of small chains was 36 percent during this period.This result
implies direct imports increased the exit probability of small chains by about 5 percent.
Additionally, I find much larger coefficients on the level of exposure each store faced in 2002
for small chains than in single-unit stores.
The IV results are likely an understatement of the impact of direct imports on the exit
probability of small stores because the instrument holds the entry decisions of large stores
fixed. If importing directly causes large stores to expand then that effect is not captured
by the instrument.
Additional Results and Controls
Here I consider specifications with the growth rate of sales as the dependent variable and
find that small stores that did not exit had slightly higher growth indicating they may have
benefited from decreased competition from other small stores. This motivates the use of
the model in the next section to consider the net effect of direct imports.
The first additional specifications I consider have different dependent variables. In par-
ticular, I consider the percent change in sales between 2002 and 2007 and the change in
sales measured by the Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh (DHS) growth rate (Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh, 1996) which is defined as
yDHS,2002−2007im = 2
(
sales2007im − sales2002im
sales2007im + sales
2002
im
)
.
This measure is the change in sales divided by average sales over the two years. It takes
values between -2 and 2 and can be calculated for stores that exit as well as stores that do
not. In this way, I can test whether continuing stores also grow less. Table 2.8 shows that
between 2002 and 2007 real sales of both types of small stores decreased. Columns 1 and
3 show the average DHS growth rate was -0.96 for single-units and -0.73 for small chains.
Columns 2 and 4 show real sales of single-units and small chains decreased by 5.8 percent
and 4.3 percent, respectively, over the five-year period.
Table 2.9 shows results with this measure. I find that increases in import exposure lower the
DHS growth rate, but I do not find lower sales growth rates for stores that survived. This
may be due to the fact that the small stores that survived faced less competition from other
small stores. Another contributing factor might be that the stores that survived may have
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been more horizontally differentiated. Appendix B.1.5 presents additional specifications,
including: results with controls for whether a small store imports and results with the
change in exposure to large firms and general merchandisers.
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Table 2.7: Exit of Small Stores
Dependent Variable is an Indicator of Whether a Store Exits Between 2002 and 2007
Single-Unit Small Chain
OLS IV OLS IV
∆d2002−2007im 1.006*** 0.775** 1.006*** 1.728**
(0.129) (0.325) (0.249) (0.805)
d2002im 0.255 0.488** 0.989** 1.224***
(0.181) (0.232) (0.451) (0.464)
pctLim 0.066*** 0.125*** 0.042 0.105***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027)
pctGMim 0.011 -0.109*** -0.056 -0.163***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038)
pctSCim 0.068*** 0.104*** 0.004 0.014
(0.019) (0.017) (0.035) 0.037)
Log Sales -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.082*** -0.081***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Market Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.122 0.121 0.065 0.064
Observations 488,000 488,000 87,000 87,000
Notes: Dependent variable is E2002−2007im . Instrument is, ∆Z
2002−2007
im , the change import exposure of
store i using exports from China. ∆d2002−2007im is the change in direct import exposure of the store
between 2002 and 2007. d2002im is the level of exposure in 2002. pct
w
im is the exposure of store i to
firms of type w ∈ {Large, General Merchandiser, Small-Chain}. Regressions include fixed effects for
top department of each store and for the age of the store. Market controls are the commuting zone
population in 2002 and the change in commuting zone population between 2002 and 2007. Standard
errors are clustered by commuting zone and top department. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The observation count is rounded to the nearest thousand.
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Table 2.8: Summary Statistics - Growth of Small Stores
Single-Unit Small-Chain
All Continuers All Continuers
Mean -0.960 -0.058 -0.730 -0.043
Standard Deviation 1.070 0.822 1.037 0.683
Observations 488,000 259,000 87,000 56,000
Notes: Summary statistics are for the sample of single-units and small chains.
The observation count is rounded to the nearest thousand. ”All” is computed
using the D.H.S growth rate between 2002 and 2007 calculated according to
Davis et al. (1996). ”Continuers” is calculated using the percent growth rate.
42
Table 2.9: Growth of Small Stores
Dependent Variable is the Growth Rate of Sales
Single-Unit Small Chain
All Continuers All Continuers
∆d2002−2007im -1.268* 1.607* -5.257*** -2.491
(0.688) (0.861) (1.813) (-1.965)
d2002im -0.752 1.236*** -1.878* 0.803
(0.472) (0.457) (0.965) (1.418)
pctLim -0.328*** -0.183*** -0.302*** -0.181***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.061) (0.047)
pctGMim 0.166*** -0.135*** 0.305*** 0.007
(0.037) (0.030) (0.082) (0.074)
pctSCim -0.281*** -0.167*** 0.009 0.052
(0.035) (0.032) (0.080) (0.061)
Log Sales 0.171*** -0.110*** 0.129*** -0.072***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Market Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.073 0.094 0.043 0.049
Observations 488,000 259,000 87,000 56,000
Notes: The ”All” columns contain all stores with sales growth calculated using the DHS growth
rate between 2002 and 2007 calculated according to Davis et al. (1996). The ”Continuers”
columns contain only stores that existed in both 2002 and 2007, with sales growth calculated
using the log difference in sales between 2002 and 2007. ∆Z2002−2007im is the predicted change
import exposure of store i using exports from China. ∆d2002−2007im is the change in direct import
exposure of the store between 2002 and 2007. d2002im is the level of exposure in 2002. pct
w
im
is the exposure of store i to firms of type w ∈ {Large, General Merchandiser, Small-Chain}.
Market controls are the commuting zone population in 2002 and the change in commuting zone
population between 2002 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone-top
department-level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The observation count is rounded to
the nearest thousand.
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2.6 Conclusion
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Chapter 3
Foreign Sourcing and Local Retail
Concentration
3.1 Introduction
In the past 30 years, U.S. retailing has become substantially more concentrated at both the
national and local level (Smith and Ocampo, 2019). A major contributor to this change
has been the replacement of small retail firms with stores of large retail firms. The exit of
these small retail firms has been linked to increasing imports of consumer goods from China
by Smith (2019). These findings have the potential to miss important aspects of the effect
of direct imports. In particular, they do not account for the endogenous response of entry
rates of stores of all sizes to changes in trade.
This paper uses a dynamic continuous-time model of store entry and exit following Arcidi-
acono, Bayer, Blevins and Ellickson (2016) to partially account for these factors. Crucially,
the model allows for a market-level import state. The evolution of this state flexibly de-
pends on the size of the stores in the market. The model is estimated for clothing stores,
an industry where direct imports are particularly important, with results indicating that
direct imports have a negative impact on the profits of small stores, but do not lead to
increasing concentration.
These estimates are used to simulate the structure of the retail sector without the observed
increase in direct imports. The counterfactual accounts for two ways in which direct imports
changed the structure of the retail sector. First, it accounts for the exit of small stores due to
direct competition with products that were imported directly. Second, it partially accounts
for increased entry rates of large stores due to increased profits conditional on entering. I
find a relatively small importance of the direct channel. Removing only the first channel
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increases the number of small stores by six percent. The number of small clothing stores
decreased by 30 percent during this period, which implies trade accounts for at least 14
percent of the decrease. However, no change in local concentration is found because large
stores replace the exiting small stores.
The key challenge in this paper is simultaneously modeling importing decisions and local
retail markets. Retail firms make importing decisions at the firm level based on the com-
petitive environment they face in each of the markets in which they have a store. Modeling
both choices simultaneously would eliminate the ability to treat each market independently
of all others which is the typical assumption in the dynamic entry game literature (Aguir-
regabiria and Nevo, 2011). I maintain the independence assumption by modeling imports
as a market-level state that evolves according to the number and type of stores in a market.
This assumption maintains tractability while accounting for the level of import competition
that each store faces. I show that under mild conditions these estimates are a lower bound
on the effect of importing.
Another innovation of this paper is focusing on the intensive margin of importing. I measure
import exposure as the fraction of competitor’s sales that are imported directly, instead of
the fraction of competitors that import anything. These two measures differ substantially
because many retailers import a small amount of their products directly while a few large
retailers import a significant fraction of their sales directly. This paper focuses on the frac-
tion of competitors’ sales that is directly imported because this fraction should correspond
to the amount competitors’ save by avoiding intermediary markups.
The results indicate that increasing direct imports played a substantial role in causing the
exit of small stores. For single-unit stores, a one percentage point increase in the fraction
of goods imported directly in a market increases the probability of exit of a store that
was previously indifferent between entering and exiting by 14 percentage points. This is
a significant effect given that nationally the fraction of clothing sales that were imported
directly increased from three to six between 1997 and 2007. I find these effects are also large
relative to the effect of entry by an additional general merchandise store, which increases
the probability of exit by an indifferent store by six percentage points.
This study contributes to the literature on concentration in the retail sector by estimating
the contribution of importing by retailers in affecting local concentration. A growing body of
work has shown increasing national concentration and the declining labor share (Autor et al.,
2017), as well as declining churn and reallocation of aggregate activity to large established
firms (Decker et al., 2014). Despite a broad consensus on increased concentration, there is
little evidence on the mechanisms driving the change. This paper contributes by focusing on
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a specific sector, retail, in which the growth in aggregate concentration has been particularly
dramatic.1 I show it is important to distinguish between local and aggregate concentration
when thinking about these trends. In particular, an investigation is undertaken on the role
of globalization in benefiting large retailers by providing them with direct access to cheap
goods. The evidence does not suggest that imported inputs are a driving force behind local
concentration in the retail sector.
I contribute to ongoing research on the role of foreign sourcing by studying how it impacts
the decisions of retail firms. Previous work has shown that retailers play an important role in
imports from China (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott, 2010). Ganapati (2018) shows
that intermediary markups can be substantial, which implies the marginal cost savings
of importing directly can be large. The focus of this paper is on the domestic impact of
direct imports by large firms on small retailers. My results complement work by Meinen and
Raff (2018) who find that increases in aggregate industry-level direct imports are associated
with the exit of small stores. This study’s dataset allows for the construction of a store-level
measure of exposure to direct imports. The results are consistent with Meinen and Raff
(2018). Conditions are established under which the results are a lower bound on the effect
of importing. The tightness of this bound depends on the magnitude of complementaries
across activities of large retailers, such as importing, exporting, and entry as documented
in Antras, Fort and Tintelnot (2017) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2018).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3
lays out a model of retailer competition. Section 3.4 discusses the estimates of the profit
function of small stores. Section 3.5 estimates of the effect of removing direct imports on
the structure of retail. The final section concludes.
3.2 Data: Retailer Revenue and Importing
This paper combines two primary sources of confidential U.S. Census Bureau microdata
that cover 1997 to 2007, the time period during which imports of consumer goods grew
substantially. The primary source of data is the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD),
which contains employment and industry data for every store in the U.S. on a yearly basis.
Unfortunately, the data do not contain sales so I define clothing stores by the industry
reported by that store. Almost all clothing sales are accounted for by either general mer-
chandisers or stores in the clothing subsector (NAICS 448). Further details on sample
construction are detailed in Appendix B.1.4.
1Autor et al. (2017) find the national HHI in retail doubles between 1997 and 2007.
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The Longitudinal Foreign Trade and Transactions Database (LFTTD) is used for the col-
lection of data on the imports of each retailer. These data contain the value of each firm’s
imports by source country and harmonized system (HS) code on a yearly basis.
3.2.1 Creation of Department-Level Imports
Imports of clothing are identified using the concordance from Basker and Van (2010) up-
dated to include most products imported by clothing retailers.
3.2.2 Sample Construction
The retail sector is defined based on the North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) using the codes created by Fort and Klimek (2016).
The firms to which retail establishments belong are partitioned into three types: large firms,
small chains, and single units. Large firms are defined as firms with more than 100 stores
in the retail sector. These firms typically operate in many markets and have many more
than 100 stores. Small chains have between 2 and 99 stores. The majority of stores of small
chains belong to firms with fewer than 10 stores. Single unit firms have only one store in
the retail sector. Small chains and single unit firms are collectively referred to here as small
firms. I will refer to the type of stores based on the type of the firm to which they belong.
For computational reasons, the focus is on 219 commuting zones with populations under
100,000 for the entire period of the sample.2 Table 3.1 shows the average number of stores
of each type across all markets in 1997 and 2007. The data reveals that the number of
single-unit stores and small-chain stores decreased significantly. The number of single-unit
stores decreases by 29 percent from 2.74 to 1.96. Also, there were fewer small-chain stores
between 1997 and 2007, decreasing by 34 percent from 1.04 to 0.69. During the same period,
the number of large stores and general merchandisers increased significantly. The number of
large stores increased by 12 percent from 2.68 to 2.99. The number of general merchandisers
increased by 25 percent from 6.45 to 8.08. Imports also increased significantly. The average
market moved from less than 2,000 dollars in clothing imports per worker to more than
7,000 dollars in clothing imports per worker.3
There is a significant amount of turnover from year to year. Table 3.2 shows the number of
stores of each type that enter and exit in the average year.
On average 0.49 new single-unit stores enter each market each year, but 0.57 exit, which
2In particular, the first stage of estimation involves maximization with an expectation-maximization
algorithm and 150 parameters in the conditional choice probabilities.
3Imports per worker are measured in 2007 U.S. dollars.
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Table 3.1: Sample Summary Statistics
1997 2007
Single-Unit 2.74 1.96
Small Chains 1.04 0.69
Large Firms 2.68 2.99
General Merchandisers 6.45 8.08
Imports 1.07 3.45
Notes: Figures represent the average num-
ber of stores of each type of firm and import
state for 219 commuting zones for 1997 and
2007.
leads to a decrease in the total number of single-unit stores. Turnover for small chains is
lower than for single-unit stores, even after accounting for the smaller number of small-chain
stores in each market.
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Table 3.2: Number of Stores Entering and Exiting by Type
Mean S.D.
Number of new single-units 0.49 0.78
Number of exiting single-units 0.57 0.85
Number of new small-chains 0.09 0.35
Number of exiting small-chains 0.14 0.43
Number of new large stores 0.39 0.72
Number of exiting large stores 0.32 0.64
Number of new general merchandisers 0.89 1.12
Number of exiting general merchandisers 0.72 0.99
Notes: The figures represent the average number of entering and
exiting stores of each type per year, across 219 commuting zones
and 10 years.
3.3 Model
The previous results establish that increasing competition from direct imports led to the
exit of small stores. This section investigates the net effect of direct imports. In particular,
it covers how both entry and exit decisions of small retailers depend on competition from
direct imports, large retailers, and other small retailers in their markets.
3.3.1 Description of the Model
Overview
The model follows the setup of Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins and Ellickson (2016) (ABBE).
ABBE use the model to study the response of grocery stores to the entry of Walmart into
the grocery business. They model the entry and exit decisions of small stores, large chains,
and Walmart. I modify their setup to add an additional store type and direct imports,
but only allow each firm to operate one store in a market. This assumption is necessary
to preserve tractability and maintain the confidentiality of the firms in the dataset. In the
estimation, I will focus on product categories and markets where it is rare for a firm to have
multiple stores.
There are four types of stores classified by the size of the firm to which they belong and
the industry of the store: single-unit (firms with one store), small chains (firms with 2 to
99 stores), large (firms with more than 100 stores, excluding general merchandisers), and
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(large) general merchandisers (firms in subsector 452 with more than 100 stores).4 I will
refer to the type of a store by the type of the retailer to which it belongs. The focus is
on the entry and exit decisions of single-unit stores and small chains and how they are
influenced by competition from large retailers, general merchandisers, and direct imports
of competitors. The model takes place in continuous time with players receiving random
opportunities to enter or exit.
The key departure from ABBE is to incorporate the degree of direct importing in a market
as a state variable. I model the evolution of this state variable in a particular market as
depending on the composition of the types of firms in the market. It is important to note
that I will be abstracting from national-level importing decisions. Furthermore, for small
firms, I will specify an underlying structural model. For large firms, I will estimate reduced
form policy functions.
The decisions of small stores depend on the number of stores of each type, the importing
decisions of these stores, and market characteristics. I do not formally model the importing
decisions of large firms because doing so would make the decisions of large firms interde-
pendent across locations. I assume that small stores track the number of large stores and
the average imports of these stores. In the estimation, I allow for these states to depend on
each other in a flexible manner.5
Timing
Time is continuous and each store receives opportunities to move with rate λ. With each op-
portunity to move, an incumbent store can elect to exit or do nothing, j ∈ {exit, nothing}.
A potential entrant can elect to enter or do nothing, j ∈ {enter, nothing}.
There are a number of benefits to setting up the timing in this way instead of having players
make simultaneous moves. The primary benefits for this paper are that counterfactuals can
be estimated quickly even with a large state space due to the fact that only one agent
can move at a time. Thus, from any state only a small number of states are immediately
attainable.6
4This differs from the regression results when general merchandisers were included in both large firms
and general merchandisers.
5In principal, small stores could also track other moments of the distribution of imports across retailers.
The only cost is an increased state space.
6ABBE review additional benefits in section 6.4.
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Markets
There are many markets that differ in terms of their population (which varies), their average
growth rate in population (c), and a permanent unobserved type (z). The growth rate is
treated as a permanent observed market type that affects the transition of all states. Thus,
agents expect the population to increase at a higher frequency in growing markets.
My treatment of the permanent unobserved type follows Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).
The unobserved type is allowed to affect the profitability of entering and remaining in a
market differently for stores of every type.7 It is assumed that each market has a number
of potential entrants of each type Eh.8
State Space
The state of a market with type (c, z) consists of population level, import level, and number
of stores of each type. I define the state x as a vector that contains eight elements. It
contains the number of stores by single-unit firms (NSU ), small chains (NC), large firms
(NL), general merchandisers (NGM ), the market import penetration level d, and the current
population, S:9
x = (NSU , NC , NL, NGM , d, S, c, z).
I define the function l(h, j, x) to give the new state conditional on agent h taking action j in
state x. For the purposes of this function the agents are h ∈ {SU,C,L,GM,D, S}, where
D is imports and S is population.
Imports follow a Markov jump process that depends on the state with F (d′|x) the probability
that the import state becomes d′ at any instant given a current state. Population also follows
a Markov jump process and increases with probability qu(c) and decreases with probability
qd(c).
Flow profits of Single-Unit and Small-Chain Stores
I approximate the flow payoff of a single-unit store, piSU , as a function of market population
S, the number of other single-unit stores, NSU , the number of small chain stores, NC , the
number of large stores, NL, the number of general merchandise stores, NGM , the level of
7I assume the market can be in one of five unobserved states z = {−1.3998,−0.5319, 0, 0.5319, 1.3998},
chosen to be a discretization of a standard normal distribution.
8It is assumed that there are three potential single-unit entrants, one potential small chain entrant, three
potential large chain entrants, and three potential general merchandiser entrants. These numbers are chosen
such that the average entry probability of each type of store is about 10 percent.
9d and S are treated as discrete variables.
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import penetration, d, and the unobserved state, z. Flow profits for a store of type SU in
state x are:
piSU (x) = βSU0 +β
SU
SU (N
SU−1)+βSUC NC+βSUL NL+βSUGMNGM+βSUd d+βSUS S+βSUT
(
NSU
)2
+βSUz zN
SU
I include the square of the number of firms of the same type to allow for economies/disec-
onomies of scale in the number of single-unit stores in a market.10 The unobserved state is
allowed to affect the degree to which other stores change the profits of small stores.
The flow profits of small chains are defined similarly as:
piC(x) = βC0 +β
C
SUN
SU+βCC (N
C−1)+βCLNL+βCGMNGM+βCd d+βCS S+βCT
(
NC
)2
+βCz zN
C
Value Functions of Single-Unit and Small-Chain Stores
For a particular market the value function for store i with firm type h ∈ {SU,C} in state
k is given by:
(λ+ ρ)V h(x) = pih +
∑
j∈{d,u}
qj(c)(V
h(l(S, j, x)− V h(x))
+
∑
d′∈D
F (d′|x)(V h(l(D, d′, x))− V h(x))
+
∑
h∈{S,SC,L,GM}
λNhσhexit(V
h(l(h, exit, x)− V h(x))
+
∑
h∈{S,SC,L,GM}
λEhσhenter(V h(l(h, enter, x)− V h(x))
+ λEmax{V h(x) + εstay, εexit}
(3.1)
The value function depends on the flow profits in that state, the value when the state
changes due to population, imports, or a competitor’s action, and the value if the agent
is allowed to move. At each opportunity to move, stores observe information about the
profitability of each choice in terms of an instantaneous payoff εj that is unobserved to
the econometrician. I assume that these payoffs are distributed independently over time
according to a type 1 extreme value distribution.11
10For example, initially single-unit stores could share distribution networks, lowering their costs.
11If a store closes, it is assumed that it cannot reopen, which implies the value of exit is zero.
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Choice Probabilities
A potential entrant that receives an opportunity to move must pay a fixed cost to build a
store that depends on the type of firm, fh, and the unobserved state. Thus, given some
current state x a firm will enter if
V h(l(h, enter, x)) + fh + γhz + εenter ≥ εstay,
The probability that an entrant of type h enters is
σhenter(x) =
exp(V h(l(h, enter, x)) + fh + γhz)
exp(V h(l(h, enter, x)) + fh + γhz) + 1
.
Similarly, an incumbent will exit if
V h(x) + εstay ≤ εexit.
Then the probability that an incumbent of type h exits is
σhexit(x) =
1
exp(V h(x)) + 1
.
Equilibrium
I focus on Markov perfect equilibria in pure strategies as characterized by Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007). Thus, a Markov perfect equilibrium is a collection of policy functions
σ = {σSUenter, σCenter, σLenter, σGMenter, σSUexit, σCexit, σLexit, σGMexit } such that σhenter and σhexit solve the
maximization problems of each type h.
3.3.2 Estimation
I estimate the model for stores that are in the clothing subsector (448). Clothing is a
department characterized by many large firms, high direct imports, and significant com-
petition from general merchandisers. General merchandisers account for about 40 percent
of clothing sales in 2007 (CRT, 2007). Clothing is the second largest department, behind
groceries, making it the largest department with significant exposure to trade.12
12Estimation is in progress with electronics and appliances as well.
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Estimation Algorithm
Estimation takes place in two steps. In the first step, I estimate conditional choice proba-
bilities and the probability that each market is in unobserved state zk. In the second step,
I estimate the flow payoff and fixed costs of entry parameters of single-unit and small-chain
stores taking the conditional choice probabilities of the other stores as given.
Conditional Choice Probabilities
In the first step, I estimate the probability that player i makes choice j in state k with
unobserved state z. I assume
σij(k, z, α) =
φj(k, z, α)∑
j′∈Aik φj′(k, z, α)
,
where φ is a function of: a constant; the number of single-unit establishments and their
square; the number of small chain establishments and their square; the number of large es-
tablishments and their square; the number of general merchandise establishments and their
square; the square of the number of total establishments; the level of import competition;
indicators of the market type; the unobserved state; and the interaction of population with
the number of stores of each type. Additionally, I allow the import penetration transition
probabilities to depend on the share of large stores and general merchandise stores and
the fixed cost of building a store to depend on the unobserved state. For computational
simplicity, the transition probability of the population is estimated using the frequency of
population transitions between 1997 and 2007 in the markets used in the sample.
Objective Function
In many markets, there are multiple openings and closings within a year. In the data there
is only one observation per year, but the model takes place in continuous time so I simulate
R paths for each observation, which consist of sequences and timings for each of the M
moves that took place in the market during the year.13
I define the likelihood of a single observation n in market m, where the starting and ending
states are k
¯
and k¯. Let W be the number of events that occurred during the year. Let k
(r)
w
denote the state immediately preceding event w in simulation r, with w = 1, . . . ,W + 1. I
simulate paths r = 1, . . . , R such that k
(r)
1 = k¯
and k
(r)
W+1 = k¯. Let I
(r)
w (i, j) be the indicator
13I do not observe the specific time during the year during which each establishment entered or exited.
ABBE find similar estimates using exact Walmart entry dates as when they use only yearly information.
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for whether event w of the r-th simulation was action j taken by firm i and let t
(r)
w and τ
(r)
w
be the absolute time and holding time of simulated event w.
The likelihood for observation n in market m is
L˜mn(h(α); z) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
W∏
w=1
 ∑
j∈{−1,1}
I(r)w (0, j)qj +
∑
i
λ
∑
j 6=0
I(r)w (i, j)σ˜ij
(
k(r)w , z, α
)
× exp
−
 ∑
j∈{−1,1}
qj +
∑
i
λ
∑
j 6=0
σ˜(k(r)w , z, α)
 τ (r)w

× exp
−
 ∑
j∈{−1,1}
qj +
∑
i
λ
∑
j 6=0
σ˜ij(k
(r)
W+1, z, α)
(1− t(r)W )
 .
(3.2)
The first line of equation (3.2) is the probability that event w occurred, the second is
the probability that no other event occurred during time period τ
(r)
w , the final line is the
probability that no event occurred between the last simulated event and the end of the
period.
Unobserved Heterogeneity:
Since z is unobserved, I estimate the probability each market has type zk as a function
of initial conditions.14 I allow zk to take five values which are chosen to approximate a
standard normal distribution.
Let P (z, k1) be the probability of the unobserved state being z, given that the observed
state was k1 for the first observation. With M markets and T periods in each, summing
with respect to the distribution of the unobserved state yields
(α˜, P˜ ) = arg max
(α,P )
M∑
m=1
ln
(∑
z
P (z, km1)
T∏
n=1
L˜mn(h(α); z)
)
. (3.3)
This is estimated using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm following Arcidia-
cono and Miller (2011) to get both reduced form hazards and the probability each market
is in an unobserved state.
14Specifically, the probability that a market has a particular value of the unobserved state is modeled as
an ordered logit that depends on the number of stores of each type, the interaction of these counts with
population, the import state, and the city growth time in the initial period.
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Estimation of Structural Parameters
Given the estimates of the reduced form hazard function, I can turn to estimating the
structural parameters of each firm.
From proposition 4 in ABBE, I can rewrite the value function in terms of the estimated
choice probabilities and structural parameters. Then, estimating the structural parameters
consists of maximum likelihood estimation as a function of the structural parameters.
3.3.3 Effects of Trade in the Model
I use my model to conduct a counterfactual to study the effects of trade in the retail sector.
The exercise seeks to compare the economy exposed to trade with China (the U.S. economy
after 1997) with a counterfactual economy that was not exposed to the 1997 China shock.
The difficulty in this exercise is estimating how the large stores and general merchandisers
would respond to this alternative policy change.
I introduce an additional parameter, τ , which specifies the trade regime. In particular, τ0 is
the trade regime prior to 1997 when very few imports came from China and τ ′ is the trade
regime after the 1997 China shock. The policy functions estimated using data between
1997 and 2007 were estimated under the trade regime τ ′. So the estimated policy functions
are σhenter(x, τ
′), σhexit(x, τ
′) for h ∈ {SU,C,L,GM}. I assume that τ affects the transition
probability on the import state such that a higher τ implies the import state is more likely
to be high. Formally, let τ ′ > τ , then F (d|x, τ ′) < F (d|x, τ).
I place two assumptions on the policy functions of large stores and general merchandisers
which allow me to calculate a lower bound on the effect of trade:
1. Entry of large stores and general merchandisers is increasing in the trade regime
σhenter(x, τ
0) ≤ σhenter(x, τ ′) for h ∈ {L,GM}.
2. Entry of large stores and general merchandisers is increasing in the import state
∂σhenter(x, τ
′)
∂d
> 0.
The first assumption is consistent with estimates of Meinen and Raff (2018) and the second
assumption is consistent with the estimated policy functions.
These assumptions imply
σ˜henter(x, τ
0) = σhenter(x, τ
′)
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for h ∈ {L,GM} is a lower bound on the effect of moving from τ ′ to τ0. In this scenario,
the behavior conditional on x does not change, but under τ0 it is assumed that d = 0.
Given these policy functions for large stores and general merchandisers, I calculate the best
responses for single-unit and small-chain stores which I refer to as σ˜henter and σ˜
h
exit. Under
assumptions 1 and 2, the share of small stores under τ0 is less than the share calculated
using the policy functions σ˜henter(x, τ
0). Thus, this counterfactual provides a lower bound
on the effect of direct imports.
Let µ be the stationary distribution of x given some trade regime τ . The counterfactual
involves comparing µ′ to µ0 to calculate the stationary share of single-unit and small-chain
stores.
3.4 Results
Table 3.3 reports profit coefficients for single-unit clothing stores and small-chain clothing
stores both with and without unobserved heterogeneity. Imports and competition with
general merchandisers negatively affect the profits of both types of small stores. Surpris-
ingly, single-unit stores are more affected by competition with both imports and general
merchandisers. Consider a single-unit store that has an entry probability of 50 percent.
The coefficient on imports of -0.57 implies that an increase in the import state lowers the
entry probability to 36 percent. The coefficient of -0.27 on general merchandisers suggests
the entry probability would decrease to 43 percent. Both of those are significant effects
given that the level of imports increased by 1.38 on average and the number of general
merchandisers increased by 1.63.
The effect of large stores on profits is more mixed. Without unobserved heterogeneity I
find both single-unit stores and small chains are both negatively affected by competition
with large firms, but when unobserved heterogeneity is included, no effect of large stores
on single units is found. I find evidence of economies of scale with small stores at first, but
these fall off as the number of stores increases. The unobserved heterogeneity results suggest
positive returns to scale until 7 single-unit stores and 6 small chains are present when the
unobserved state is zero. In all cases, I find fixed costs are larger for small chains than single
units, but the unserved state decreases the fixed cost of small chains significantly. On the
other hand, higher unobserved states decreases the profits of single-unit stores.
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Table 3.3: Structural Parameter Estimates
No Unobserved Unobserved
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
SU C SU C
Constant (β0) −20.370 −22.370 −16.870 −13.440
Number of Single-Unit Stores (βSU ) 1.501 −0.095 1.008 −0.186
Number of Small-Chain Stores (βC) −0.159 2.482 −0.254 1.967
Number of Large Stores (βL) −0.318 −0.192 0.022 −0.185
Number of GM Stores (βGM ) −0.582 −0.230 −0.276 −0.064
Import Penetration (βd) −0.625 −0.401 −0.570 −0.080
Population (βS) 0.661 1.156 0.528 0.079
Number of own type squared (βT ) −0.174 −0.305 −0.070 −0.143
Unobserved state×number of own type (βz) −0.119 −0.231
Entry cost (f) −1.780 −3.639 −2.010 −6.434
Entry cost × unobserved state −0.063 2.964
Notes: Estimates of structural parameters for stores in the clothing industry. Coefficients represent the
effect of each variable on flow profits by type of store. SU - Single-unit, C-Small Chain. Coefficients in
value function units. Unobserved heterogeneity specifications include 5 unobserved states.
3.5 Counterfactual: Retail Without Direct Imports
In this section, I run a series of counterfactuals where imports are removed to estimate their
effect on the clothing industry. Removing imports has two effects. First, it increases flow
profits of small stores making them more likely to import and less likely to exit. Second,
it changes the entry and exit decisions of large stores both through a direct effect on their
profits and through their response to the different policy functions of the other firms.
I use my estimates of structural parameters for the small stores to remove direct imports
from the flow profits of the small stores. Then, I simulate the model with different assump-
tions regarding how the policy functions of large stores and general merchandisers would
change if imports were removed. This simulation provides estimates of how removing im-
ports would affect the structure of retail. The estimates depend on the direct effect of
eliminating imports and different assumptions on the indirect effect.
In each simulation, I compare the number of stores of each type in 2007 to the number in
the baseline case. I also compute the average of the local HHI. It is assumed that all stores
of each type have sales equal to the average store of that type in the sample and that each
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firm operates only one shop.15 All values are taken from the Census of Retail Trade in 2007.
In all scenarios, I modify the relevant parameters of the conditional choice probabilities and
structural parameters. Then, I use value function iteration to solve for new best responses
of both types of small stores.16
No Imports in Flow Profits
The first counterfactual considered is one where direct imports do not affect the flow profits
of small stores, but the policy functions of large stores and general merchandisers remain
unchanged. I simulate each market’s state in 2007 using 1997 as the starting point with
βsI = β
c
I = 0. I compare these results to the baseline in table 3.4. I find that removing
imports from the flow profits increases the number of both single-unit stores and small
chains, but the effects are relatively small. The number of single-unit stores increased by
eight percent and the number of small chains increased by almost three percent. Together
these imply the total number of small stores increased by six percent. The number of
small clothing stores decreased by 30 percent during this period, which suggests direct
imports account for at least 14 percent of the decrease. I calculate the average HHI across
all markets using the average value of clothing sales for stores of each type. Although
the average number of small stores increased, I find no change in the average HHI across
markets.
Entry of Large Firms
In the second counterfactual, I set d = 0 and solve for new best responses of small stores.
This counterfactual provides a tighter lower bound on the effect of importing under the
assumptions in section 3.3.3.17
15The markets used are small enough it is rare for a firm to have multiple stores in a market.
16The resulting policy functions should not be thought of as equilibrium policy functions because the mod-
ified conditional choice probabilities I use for large and general merchandise stores may not be equilibrium
strategies.
17Estimation of this counterfactual is in process.
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Table 3.4: Counterfactual Results
No Unobserved Heterogeneity
Single Unit Small Chain Large GM Average HHI
Baseline 3.203 2.612 9.528 6.094 0.08
βsI = β
c
I = 0 3.469 2.684 8.934 5.813 0.08
Notes: Estimates of counterfactual number of stores of each type and local HHI. Rows are
for different assumptions on how the policy functions of large firms change when direct
imports are removed.
3.6 Conclusion
I develop a model of retailer competition with direct imports to test how competition with
direct imports affects the entry and exit decisions of small stores. I find that direct imports
account for at least 14 percent of the decrease in the number of small stores. The results
of this research indicate that direct imports have played an important role in increasing
national concentration in the retail sector, but have little effect on local concentration.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Comparison to Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2019)
Prior papers studying competition in the retail sectors have defined each store’s competitors
using industry codes. In particular, a recent paper by Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter
(2019) find that despite increases in aggregate concentration at the SIC 8-digit, level local
concentration has fallen across many geographies for many sectors. In this section, we
compare my results to their results on the retail sector and speculate on the reason for
differences.
As mentioned in Section 1.4, there are three main differences between our work and RST’s.
First, we use different data sources. While they use the U.S. NETS dataset we use confiden-
tial Census microdata. Second, we use NAICS codes to define industries in the retail sector,
while they use SIC codes. Third, RST report the average change in the local HHI, weight-
ing by the end-of-period sales/employment of each market, while we report the change in
the average local HHI, weighting markets in each year according to that year’s sales. To
better understand the differences between our work and RST’s, we present industry- and
product-based measures of concentration varying the weighting scheme used in aggregation.
Table A.1 has the results of the comparison. In the first section, national concentration,
we compare the numbers in RST (Figure 1b) to numbers calculated for three different sam-
ples. NAICS-based measures calculate concentration separately for all 6-digit industries in
NAICS. Select NAICS calculates concentration for all 6-digit NAICS excluding auto dealers
and auto-parts stores (441), gasoline stations (447), and non-store retailers (454). Finally,
product-based measures calculate concentration for the eight major departments defined
in Section 1.5. In all four cases, national concentration is increasing significantly. Despite
differences in the initial levels of concentration (column 1) the national HHI increases by
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two to three times in all cases.1
Table A.1: Comparison of Concentration to RST
National Concentration
Level Change from 1992
1992 1997 2002 2007
RST N/A 0.020 0.030 0.050
NAICS-based 0.029 0.017 0.056 0.076
Select NAICS 0.046 0.034 0.097 0.136
Product-based 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.040
Zip Code Concentration - End-of-Period Weights
Level Change from 1992
RST N/A -0.070 -0.100 -0.140
NAICS-based 0.507 0.024 -0.018 -0.019
Select NAICS 0.552 -0.021 -0.018 -0.015
Product-based N/A N/A N/A N/A
Zip Code Concentration - Current Period Weights
Level Change from 1992
RST N/A N/A N/A N/A
NAICS-based 0.507 0.022 0.057 0.072
Select NAICS 0.552 0.026 0.067 0.083
Product-based 0.321 -0.015 0.020 0.033
Notes: Comparison of concentration numbers calculated us-
ing the Census of Retail Trade to Rossi-Hansberg et al.
(2019). Numbers from RST taken from retail series in Fig-
ure 1b. 1992 column contains the level of concentration
which is not available in RST. NAICS-based measures con-
centration calculated including all NAICS industries. Select
NAICS drops subsectors 441, 447, and 454. Product-based
measures calculate concentration for the eight major prod-
uct categories. Retail in RST is defined using SIC codes
which includes restaurants. Product-based measures with
RST’s methodology have not been disclosed.
The second portion of table A.1 compares concentration measured at the zip code level using
the weighting methodology described in RST. In particular, RST calculate the change in
concentration for each market-industry pair between 1992 and some year t. Those changes
are aggregated to an index of local concentration using the share of employment in each
industry-market pair in year t. Using the methodology in RST we find evidence for slight
1The level of concentration is not provided in RST.
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decreases in local concentration. RST find local concentration falls by 14 percentage points,
but we find it falls by less than two percentage points. These results partially reconcile our
findings with RST’s, with differences remaining in the type of industry classification and
data source.
The final part of table A.1 compares concentration measured at the zip code level by cal-
culating concentration for each market-industry pair within a year then aggregating to an
index of local concentration for each year. These aggregate local indexes are then differ-
enced to calculate the change in concentration. We find evidence for increasing concentra-
tion. Importantly, this happens at both the NAICS and department level, suggesting that
the difference in the direction of the trends of local concentration is due to the weighting
methodology and not the use of of industry- or product-based measures.
The results under the two weighting schemes (panels 2 and 3) differ for a simple reason,
when markets grow they tend to become less concentrated. Thus, weighting changes in
concentration using period t shares weights markets with decreases in concentration more
than if one uses current period shares. However, weighting using current period shares is not
without problems. In particular, local concentration can change only because of changes in
the weights on each market. We use current period shares when calculating concentration
because those are the weights for which my decomposition holds.
A.2 Concentration Decomposition
This section provides additional details on the concentration decomposition.
The decomposition starts from the probability that two dollars are spent at the same firm
which can be divided into three components.
P (ix = iy) = P (ix = iy|mx = my)P (mx = my) + P (ix = iy|mx 6= my)P (mx 6= my)
The local concentration term can be decomposed into a component due to the average
number of firms in each market and a term due to the inequality of shares across firms
within a market.
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The cross market term is defined as
P (ix = iy|mx 6= my) =
∑
k
∑
j 6=k
P (mx = k,my = j|mx 6= my)P (ix = iy|mx = k,my = j)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Samples and Data Methods
B.1.1 Empirical Sample Selection Criteria
Selection into the empirical sample is based on both CRT and LBD activity. I calculate the
percentage of each firm’s employment that is in the retail sector using the LBD. I define a
firm to be a retail firm if at least half of its employees are in retail establishments.1 I require
a retail firm to have at least one establishment included in official tabulations.2 If a firm
has no employment in the LBD, but has sales in the Census of Retail Trade it is included
in the sample. I define the size of a firm based on the number of establishments it has in
the retail sector.
I assign each firm a subsector (3-digit NAICS) based on the plurality of their employment
in retail. Retail firms typically have establishments in only one subsector. The average
firm has 99 percent of its employment in the subsector to which it is assigned, and over 95
percent of retail employment is in the top subsector of the firm that owns the establishment.
I assign establishments to commuting zones using the concordance from David Dorn.
B.1.2 Cleaning and Aggregating Product Lines Data
The Census collects data on establishment-level sales in a number of categories of goods.
An example form is provided in figure B.1. Many establishments have missing product line
sales either due to them not responding to questions or because they do not receive a form.3
1This cutoff does not matter much. Firms typically have either more than 90 percent of their employment
in retail or almost none of their employment in retail.
2This means tabbed is yes and the new NAICS code assigned to it is retail for 1992 and later. I also drop
establishments in Hawaii and Alaska as well as those that are missing geographic information.
3Establishments of large firms are always mailed a form, but small firms are sampled.
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In total reported product lines, data account for about 80 percent of sales. I develop an
algorithm to impute data for missing establishments. This involves aggregating product line
codes to the point that the industry of an establishment and the establishment’s answer
to the kind of business question is highly informative about their sales. For example, I
aggregate lines for Women’s clothes, Men’s clothes, children’s clothes, and footwear into a
department called clothing. I establish 20 departments detailed in table B.1.2. Of these 20
departments, 8 of them account for the vast majority of sales of stores in my sample. The
other 12 departments are specialty categories that account for a small fraction of aggregate
sales and are sold primarily by establishments in one specific industry. For example, glasses
are sold almost exclusively by establishments in 446130 (optical goods stores). I create these
categories so that establishments that sell these products are not included in concentration
measures for the 8 main departments.
Aggregating Product Lines
The first step of cleaning the data is to aggregate reported broad and detailed product
line codes into departments. Some codes reported by retailers do not correspond to valid
product line codes. I allocate those sales to a miscellaneous department. The Census
analyzes reported product line codes to check for issues and flags observations as usable
if they pass this check. I include only observations that are usable. I then map these
codes to departments. I use the reported percentage of total sales accounted for by each
product line instead of the dollar value because the dollar value is often missing. Typically
an establishment either reports product line data for 100 percent of its sales or does not
report any data. For the small number of establishments that report product lines data
summing to a number other than 100 percent I rescale the percentages so that they sum to
one.4 After this procedure, I have sales by department for all establishments that reported
lines data.
Imputing Missing Data
For the remaining establishments I impute data using the NAICS 8 industry of the es-
tablishment (where available), reported sales of other establishments of the same firm in
the same industry, and reported activity of the same establishment in other census years.5
Most establishments are assigned a distribution of sales across departments that matches
4This procedure has a minimal effect on aggregate retail sales in each department.
5Reported product line sales are very similar across establishments of the same firm and the same estab-
lishment over time.
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the mean of establishments in the same industry that report sales.
I find that this procedure predicts sales accurately for most establishments, but a small
number of stores in each industry report selling very different things than all other stores
in that industry. In these cases, the prediction misses by a lot.
Using this aggregation method, establishments overwhelmingly only have significant sales
in two departments which increases confidence in the imputation. Additionally, I have
compared the aggregate sales in my data to the Consumer Expenditure Survey which is an
independent program, and they are in line with the numbers from that source.6
Where relevant all sales are deflated using consumer price indexes. I use the food deflator
for Groceries, Clothing and Apparel deflator for Clothing and the deflator for all goods
excluding food and fuel for all other categories.
Table B.1: List of Departments
Department Main Corresponding Industry Example Firm
Automotive Goods N 441 Ford Dealer
Clothing Y 448 Old Navy
Electronics and Appliances Y 443 Best Buy
Furniture Y 442 Ikea
Services N N/A
Other Retail Goods N N/A
Groceries Y 445 Trader Joe’s
Health Products Y 446 CVS
Fuel N 447 Shell Gasoline
Sporting Goods Y 451 Dick’s Sporting Goods
Toys Y 451 Toys ”R” Us
Home & Garden Y 444 Home Depot
Paper Products N 453210
Jewelry N 423940 Jared
Luggage N 448320 Samsonite
Optical Goods N 446130 Lenscrafters
Non-retail Goods N N/A
Books N 451211 Borders
Notes: Author created list of departments. Main indicates that a department is included in concen-
tration calculations. Firm names for illustrative purposes only and do not imply that firm is in the
analytical sample.
6Retail sales include some sales to companies so it is expected that retail sales in a department to exceed
consumer spending on that department.
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B.1.3 Mapping HS Codes to Product Lines
The starting point from my mapping of HS codes to product lines is the concordance from
Basker and Van (2010) which maps HS codes to broad product lines. I then aggregate
broad product lines to departments using the same concordance as in the product lines
data. I then update the concordance using the LFTTD and CRT. Specifically, I create a
list of HS codes that are imported by retail firms, but not assigned to a product line by
Basker and Van (2010). This approach means that almost all retailer imports are defined
to be consumer goods imports, but can overstate total imports of consumer goods.7 I then
assign these codes to departments by investigating the codes that have the most imports
by retailers manually and then assigning the rest using the industry of the firms that do
the importing.
Using this procedure ensures retailer imports are almost all mapped to departments, but
it can cause me to overstate total imports of consumer goods to the extent there are HS
codes that are imported by retailers for sale to consumers, but are also imported by other
firms where the final customer is not an individual, but a business. Ideally, I would identify
all imports that end up in consumer’s hands without any transformation and then see
what fraction are imported directly by retailers, but this is not possible. Instead, I use a
procedure that gives me a lower bound on the fraction of consumer goods imported directly
by retailers.
I deflate imports using the BLS import deflators for the 20 HS sections.
B.1.4 Model Sample Selection Criteria
Estimation of the model requires only information on the existence of establishments, their
industry, firm type, and competition from imports. Thus, I use only the LBD as that lets
me observe establishments on a yearly basis. Establishments can change their firm type
and industry over time so I use the mode of their size category and industry between 1991
and 2008. Most establishments do not change type or industry during this period.
I calculate the number of general merchandise establishments and firms as the number of
stores in 452 excluding NAICS 452990 (Other General Merchandise Stores), because those
stores do not report selling a significant amount of clothing.
I calculate commuting zone population using data downloaded from http://data.nber.
org/data/census-intercensal-county-population.html. The data are county level
population estimates by year. I aggregate to commuting zones using the concordance from
7For example a retailer may import a desk to sell to consumers, but other companies import desks to
furnish offices.
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David Dorn. I take the log of population and create 7 categories of population such that
each population level represents an increase of 20 percent from the previous level.
Commuting zone population growth rate is divided into three categories and is permanent.
The category is fast if the annual growth rate is over 2 percent, moderate if it is between 1
and 2 percent, and low if it is less than 1 percent.
I cannot measure exposure to imports as in the regressions because I only observe sales
every 5 years. Instead I measure firm level imports by department and assign them to
individual establishments using that establishment’s share of firm employment. I sum across
all imports in a department assigned to a given commuting zone and divide those imports
by total employment in the industry most closely corresponding to the imports.
B.1.5 Additional Regression Results
I present results with an additional control for whether the store already imported at least
one percent of its sales directly in 2002. Table B.2 shows that single-unit stores that import
are actually much more likely to exit. Stores that imported in 2002 are 5.9 percentage
points more likely to exit. However, for both types of small stores importers that survive
grow more than the surviving importers. These results suggest that whether a small store
imports may be a signal that the small store sells foreign made products instead of being a
niche retailer. Thus, the small store may face more competition on the fraction of its sales
that are not imported directly.
74
Figure B.1: Sample Product Lines Form
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Table B.2: Importing and Small Store Outcomes
Single-Unit Small Chain
Dependent variable is: Exit Pct Change Exit Pct Change
∆X2002−2007im 0.755** 1.569* 1.701** -2.636
(0.319) (0.853) (0.809) (1.989)
X2002im 0.456** 1.166*** 1.189** 0.694
(0.228) (0.452) (0.462) (1.418)
pctLim 0.125*** -0.183** 0.104*** -0.185***
(0.012) (0.023) (0.027) (0.047)
pctGMim -0.104*** -0.123*** 0.160*** 0.015
(0.018) (0.029) (0.038) (0.073)
pctSCim 0.104*** -0.168*** 0.013 0.050
(0.017) (0.032) (0.037) (0.060)
imp01im 0.059*** 0.136*** 0.012 0.045***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.010) (0.016)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Market Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.122 0.094 0.064 0.049
Observations 488,000 259,000 87,000 56,000
Notes: Exit is an indicator of whether store i exits prior to 2007. Pct change is the percent change
in sales between 2002 and 2007. ∆Z2002−2007im is predicted the predicted change import exposure
of store i using exports from China. ∆X2002−2007im is the change in direct import exposure of the
store between 2002 and 2007. X2002im is the level of exposure in 2002. pct
w
im is the exposure of
store i to firms of type w ∈ {Large, General Merchandiser, Small-Chain}. imp01im is an indicator
that a store imports at least 1 percent of its sales directly. Regressions include fixed effects for
top department of each store and for the age of the store as well as controls for the log of store
sales in 2002 and the change in commuting zone population between 2002 and 2007. Standard
errors are clustered at the commuting zone-top department-level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. The observation counts are rounded to the nearest thousand.
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Table B.3: Change in Exposure to Large Retailers
Single-Unit Small Chain
Dependent variable is: Exit Pct Change Exit Pct Change
∆pctL,2002−2007im 0.322*** -0.296*** 0.374*** -0.289***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.054)
pctLim 0.144*** -0.218*** 0.161*** -0.232***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.038)
pctSCim 0.081*** -0.092*** 0.011 0.048
(0.019) (0.030) (0.035) (0.053)
Log sales -0.010*** -0.108*** -0.079*** -0.074***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Market Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.122 0.094 0.065 0.052
Observations 488,000 259,000 87,000 56,000
Notes: Exit is an indicator of whether store i exits prior to 2007. Pct change is the percent
change in sales between 2002 and 2007. ∆pctL,2002−2007im is the change in exposure to large stores
between 2002 and 2007. pctwim is the exposure of store i to firms of type w ∈ {Large, Small-Chain}.
Regressions include fixed effects for top department of each store and for the age of the store as
well as controls for the log of store sales in 2002 and the change in commuting zone population
between 2002 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone-top department-
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The observation counts are rounded to the nearest
thousand.
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Table B.4: Change in Exposure to General Merchandisers
Single-Unit Small Chain
Dependent variable is: Exit Pct Change Exit Pct Change
∆pctGM,2002−2007im 0.257*** -0.370*** 0.017 -0.255***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.041) (0.059)
pctGMim -0.058*** -0.246*** -0.139*** -0.022
(0.017) (0.026) (0.031) (0.048)
pctSCim 0.081*** -0.026 -0.077*** 0.192***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.044)
Log sales -0.100*** -0.110*** -0.081*** -0.073***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Top Department Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Market Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.122 0.094 0.065 0.051
Observations 488,000 259,000 87,000 56,000
Notes: Exit is an indicator of whether store i exits prior to 2007. Pct change is the percent
change in sales between 2002 and 2007. ∆pctGM,2002−2007im is the change in exposure to general
merchandise stores between 2002 and 2007. pctwim is the exposure of store i to firms of type
w ∈ {General Merchandisers, Small-Chain}. Regressions include fixed effects for top department
of each store and for the age of the store as well as controls for the log of store sales in 2002 and the
change in commuting zone population between 2002 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at
the commuting zone-top department-level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The observation
counts are rounded to the nearest thousand.
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